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RNS Number : 4426L  AVI Global Trust PLC  12 December 2025

 

AVI GLOBAL TRUST PLC

 

Monthly Update

 

AVI Global Trust plc (the "Company") presents its Update, reporting
performance figures for the month ended 30 November 2025.

 

This Monthly Newsletter is available on the Company's website at:
AGT-NOVEMBER-2025.pdf
(https://www.assetvalueinvestors.com/content/uploads/2025/12/AGT-Newsletter-NOV-2025.pdf?mc_cid=61aab1a769&mc_eid=335e1499b3)

 

This investment management report relates to performance figures to 30
November 2025.

 

 Total Returns (%)   Month  1Y    5Y    10Y
 AGT NAV p/s(1)      -0.6   7.4   65.9  206.4
 MSCI ACWI(2)        -0.9   13.4  77.4  234.6
 MSCI ACWI ex US(2)  -0.9   20.9  50.9  142.8

 

All performance shown net of fees in GBP Total Return as at 30/11/2025.

(1)Net Asset Value cum-fair.

(2)From 1st October 2023, the comparator benchmark was changed to the MSCI
ACWI Index. Prior to this, from 1st October 2013, the comparator benchmark was
the MSCI ACWI ex US Index.

Source: Morningstar, S&P Capital IQ

 

Manager's Comment

 

AVI Global Trust's (AGT) NAV declined -0.6% in November 2025.

Jardine Matheson was the top contributor adding +40bps to returns. Other
strong contributors were Tokyo Gas and Youngone Corp (both +31bps) . We expand
upon Youngone Corp - and its parent Youngone Holdings - below.

Vivendi was the standout detractor shaving off -154bps. Chrysalis, D'Ieteren
and News Corp also detracted.

Vivendi

Shares in Vivendi fell -20% over the month, as weak NAV performance (-6%) was
compounded by a significant widening of the discount from 38% to 46% (a return
of -14%).

In the July
(https://www.assetvalueinvestors.com/content/uploads/2025/08/AGT-JULY-2025.pdf)
2025 newsletter we provided an update on the investment in Vivendi. At the
time we explained how - subject to a court appeal process - the AMF had
declared that Vincent Bollore was obligated to make a mandatory offer for
Vivendi. This followed a ruling by a Parisian court that he was deemed to be
in de-facto control of Vivendi at the time of the December 2024 split-up
transaction.

During the month the Cour de Cassation ruled in favour of Bollore's appeal,
arguing against the notion of de-facto control and asking the lower court
judges to re-examine the case. In turn the AMF has suspended its ruling of a
mandatory takeover offer on Vivendi whilst this process continues. We now face
a wrought and long-winded legal process with an uncertain outcome and
potential further appeals to appeals.

Net-net, however, the odds of a near-term mandatory takeover offer are
meaningfully lower than a few weeks ago, and this has been reflected in a
widening of Vivendi's discount, which now stands close to 50%. We believe this
to be astounding value - wider than Vivendi's historic discount when it was a
more complex beast, and out of whack with other European holding company
discounts today - but wholly concede that there are limited catalysts for this
to narrow in the near-term.

Indeed, this serves as a great and painful reminder of the often-ethereal
nature of events/catalysts - which have a habit of not occurring or taking
longer to occur than many expect. In such scenarios, the NAV side of the
equation is imperative to one's return.

And in this vein, we believe there is a lot to be excited about. UMG shares
have underperformed significantly, having fallen -21% since late July (whilst
the MSCI ACWI is up +10%). We believe a large portion of this weakness is
attributable to more technical factors. More specifically there has been a
multi-pronged overhang deterring new buyers in the form of: 1) an overhang
from Bollore who was perceived to be a potential seller of UMG stock in the
event of a mandatory takeover offer; 2) pressure from event driven investors
who were long Vivendi and short UMG; 3) a continued overhang on account of the
delayed US listing.

This has pushed UMG to a record low valuation - with the shares trading at
<18x 2026 PE excluding the stake in Spotify. This de-rating stands in stark
contrast to the fundamentals, which are improving. Streaming growth has been
impressive in 2025 without any meaningful contribution from DSP price raises.
As we look into 2026, with the benefit of streaming 2.0 deals and faster
growth, there is a strong case that the market will start to reward this with
a higher multiple, reflective of the company's unique asset base and its
potential to sustain growth over the long-term underpinned by the
re-monetisation of music.

All told, Vivendi remains one of the highest potential upside positions in the
portfolio, with strong NAV growth prospects and a very wide discount. We added
to the position over the month.

Youngone Group

In previous newsletters, we have talked at length about the developing
opportunity set in Korea, which now accounts for 11% of NAV. Whilst there is a
thematic overlay to our investments in Korea, each individual position stands
on its own two feet, with "typical" AVI traits. In this month's newsletter, we
intend to bring this out.

The Youngone Group are two of AGT's South Korean positions, initiated in June
2025, with a joint position size of c. 2%. For liquidity purposes, we split
the position across Youngone Holdings (1.1% of NAV) and Youngone Corp (0.9% of
NAV).

We believe the group exhibits many of the qualities that we look for in our
portfolio companies. Youngone Holdings' NAV is predominantly comprised of its
53% stake in Youngone Corp, which accounts for c. 102% of market cap, as well
as positions in Youngone Outdoor, which owns the rights to the North Face
brand in South Korea, a 4% stake in Japan-listed Goldwin, and a small net cash
position.

In turn, Youngone Corp's operations are also heavily undervalued, as explained
below, and the company boasts a net cash position worth 34% of market cap.
Both companies trade at wide discounts to their sum of the parts (Youngone
Holdings -46% and Youngone Corporation -64%).

For this month's newsletter, we wanted to discuss our investment in Youngone
Corporation ("Youngone") and its OEM operations.

Youngone is a leading global manufacturer of premium technical outerwear,
acting as the strategic OEM partner to over 40 global apparel brands, such as
The North Face, Arc'teryx, Lululemon, and Patagonia.

Founded in 1974 by Ki-hak Sung as an export and sales company for apparel in
Korea, Youngone has evolved into a sophisticated manufacturer of
high-performance outerwear through five decades of accumulated expertise and
manufacturing scale. High-value performance apparel, which represents c. 85%
of Youngone's OEM sales, is a structurally less competitive and less
commoditised segment than general apparel OEM, given the complexity of
producing advanced garments at global scale and the long development cycles
required (3-4-month lead times). Youngone's major customers view the company
as an extension of their own supply chain rather than an outsourced,
replaceable vendor.

Youngone was the first garment manufacturer to enter Bangladesh in 1980, today
controlling over c. 1,000 acres of manufacturing space. The company employ
both skilled local workers, who have had internal training for 30+ years at
Youngone, and a locally experienced management team. This well-established,
large manufacturing base is a strong barrier to entry for competitors and
provides a cost-competitive foothold for Youngone's manufacturing operations.

This combination of cost advantages and high client switching costs has
compounded Youngone's consolidated earnings at a CAGR of +12% since 2008 and
delivered strong returns on capital over the same period.

 

Despite the quality of Youngone's OEM operations, the company continues to
trade at an undemanding valuation that fails to reflect the quality of its
underlying business, trading at just 1.0x P/B and 5.6x EV/fwd. EBIT. For
comparison, close listed peers Eclat Textile and Makalot Industrial, trade at
an average 5.0x PB and 14.8x EBIT. Youngone has traded at an average discount
of -65% to these peers since 2017.

 

We believe this perpetual discount is the result of the company's lack of a
capital allocation framework, holding a net cash position worth 34% of market
cap, poor quality IR materials with zero English disclosure, limited investor
access to the company, and zero international broker coverage.

 

Crucially, all of these issues are governance-and communicationrelated and
could be directly resolved with better capital discipline and shareholder
alignment. As with many first-generation, founder-led Korean companies,
Youngone has deprioritised capital returns and transparency, in favour of
preserving control and minimising tax friction ahead of succession. But with
corporate governance reform a core focus of the new DPK government, the cost
of inaction will rise as peer behaviour starts to evolve. For Youngone, even
modest improvements on any of these fronts could result in a material
re-rating, given the scale of the valuation gap and large net cash pile.

 

While we wait for these structural changes to play out, the investment case
remains underpinned by the durable, high-return OEM business, which should
continue to compound earnings at a high-single-digit to low-teens rate, on
rising volumes from key clients, such as Arc'teryx.

 

To date, Youngone Holding and Corp have delivered returns of +29% and +45%,
which translate to IRRs in the triple digits. We remain optimistic about
prospective returns.

 

Contributors / Detractors (in GBP)(4)

 

 Largest Contributors             1- month contribution  % Weight(3)

                                  bps
 Jardine Matheson                 40                     4.3
 Tokyo Gas                        31                     2.5
 Youngone Corp                    31                     0.9
 Cordiant Digital Infrastructure  27                     5.0
 Symphony                         18                     2.1

 

 Largest Detractors     1- month contribution  % Weight(3)

                        bps
 Vivendi                -154                   6.6
 Chrysalis Investments  -59                    7.8
 D'Ieteren              -37                    6.3
 News Corp A            -24                    6.3
 HD Hyundai             -18                    1.8

 

(3)All Figures shown as % of Net Asset Value

(4)Contributors and detractors from Factset

 

 

MUFG Corporate Governance Limited

Corporate Secretary

 

12 December 2025

 

LEI: 213800QUODCLWWRVI968

 

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than the content of the Newsletter referred to above, is neither incorporated
into nor forms part of the above announcement.

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