REG - Phoenix Grp Hldgs - Phoenix Group Holdings - 2016 Annual Results <Origin Href="QuoteRef">PHNX.L</Origin> - Part 6
20/03/2017 07:07
- Part 6: For the preceding part double click ID:nRST8776Ze
the individual's role and position within the Group with some adjustment to reflect their capability and contribution
Policy and operation- Base salaries are reviewed each year against companies of similar size and complexity. Both salary levels and overall remuneration are set by reference to the median data of comparators which the Remuneration Committee considers to
be suitable using both the FTSE 31-100 and the FTSE 250 as a whole, and positioning the Executive Directors' salaries around the average of the median positions in these pan-sector groups. Consideration is also given to other relevant insurance company
data.- The Remuneration Committee uses this data as a key reference point in considering the appropriate level of salary. Other relevant factors including corporate and individual performance and any changes in an individual's role and responsibilities,
and the level of salary increases awarded to other employees of the Group are also considered.- Base salary is paid monthly in cash.- Changes to base salaries normally take effect from 1 January.
Maximum- The Remuneration Committee will apply the factors set out in the previous column in considering any salary adjustments during the duration of this policy. No increase will be made if it would take an Executive Director's salary above £780,000
(being the median level of salaries for CEOs in the FTSE 31-100), provided that this figure may be increased in line with UK RPI inflation for the duration of this policy.
Performance measures- N/A
Changes from previous policy- No material changes. `Cap` for base salaries re-expressed as a monetary amount and relative positioning is confirmed.
Element and purposeBenefitsTo provide other benefits valued by recipient
Policy and operation- The Group provides market competitive benefits in kind. Details of the benefits provided in each year will be set out in the Implementation Report. The Remuneration Committee reserves discretion to introduce new benefits where it
concludes that it is in the interests of Phoenix Group to do so, having regard to the particular circumstances and to market practice.- Where appropriate, the Company will meet certain costs relating to Executive Director relocations.
Maximum- It is not possible to prescribe the likely change in the cost of insured benefits or the cost of some of the other reported benefits year-to-year, but the provision of benefits will normally operate within an annual limit of 10% of an Executive
Director's base salary.- The Remuneration Committee will monitor the costs in practice and ensure that the overall costs do not increase by more than the Remuneration Committee considers to be appropriate in all the circumstances.- Relocation expenses
are subject to a maximum limit of £150,000.
Performance measures- N/A
Changes from previous policy- No material changes.
Element and purposePensionTo provide retirement benefits and remain competitive within the market place
Policy and operation- The Group provides a competitive employer sponsored defined contribution pension plan.- All Executive Directors are eligible to participate in the Group Personal Pension ('GPP'). Executive Directors receive a contribution to GPP or
they may opt to receive the contribution in cash if they are impacted by the relevant lifetime or annual limits. Any such cash payments are reduced for the effect of employers' National Insurance Contributions.- Phoenix will honour the pensions
obligations entered into under all previous policies in accordance with the terms of such obligations.
Maximum- A contribution limit of 20% of base salary per annum per Executive Director has been set for the duration of this policy.
Performance measures- N/A
Changes from previous policy- No material changes.
Element and purposeAnnual Incentive Plan ('AIP') and Deferred Bonus Share Scheme ('DBSS') To motivate employees and incentivise delivery of annual performance targets
Policy and operation- AIP levels and the appropriateness of measures are reviewed annually to ensure they continue to support the Group's strategy.- AIP outcomes are paid in cash in one tranche (less the deferred share award).- At least 40% of any
annual AIP award is to be deferred into shares for a period of three years although the Remuneration Committee reserves discretion to alter the current practice of deferral (whether by altering the portion deferred, the period of deferral or whether
amounts are deferred into cash or shares). Such alterations may be required to ensure compliance with regulatory guidelines for pay within the insurance sector, but will not otherwise reduce the current deferral level or the period of deferral.- Deferral
of AIP outcomes into shares is currently made under the DBSS.- Awards under DBSS will be in the form of awards to receive shares for nil-cost (with the shares either being delivered automatically at vesting or being delivered at a time following vesting
at the individual's choice).- DBSS awards are made automatically each year on the fourth dealing day following the announcement of annual results, using the average of the preceding three dealing days' share prices to calculate the number of shares in
awards.- The three-year period of deferral will run to the third anniversary of the award date.- Dividend entitlements will accrue over the three-year deferral period and be delivered as additional vesting shares.- Malus/clawback provisions apply to the
AIP and to amounts deferred under DBSS as explained in the notes to this table.
Maximum- The maximum annual incentive level for an Executive Director is 150% of base salary per annum.
Performance measures- The performance measures applied to AIP will be set by the Remuneration Committee and may be financial or non-financial and corporate, divisional or individual and in such proportions as it considers appropriate. However, the
weighting of financial performance measures will not be reduced below 50% of total AIP potential in any year for the duration of this policy.- In respect of the financial performance measures, attaining the threshold performance level produces a £nil
annual incentive payment and for non-financial performance measures the threshold performance level produces an annual incentive outcome that is 10% of the weighting given to these measures.- On-target performance on all measures produces an outcome of
50% of maximum annual incentive opportunity. However, the Remuneration Committee reserves the right to adjust the threshold and target levels for future financial years in light of competitive practice.- The AIP operates subject to three levels of
moderation:i. The Remuneration Committee sets targets for relevant AIP metrics. Recognising that the business of the Company is to engage in corporate activity, the Remuneration Committee may adjust targets during the year to take account of such activity
and ensure the targets continue to reflect performance as originally intended. ii. There is a specific adjustment factor of 80%-120% of the provisional outturn whereby the Remuneration Committee may adjust the provisional figure (but subject to any over
-riding cap) to take account of its broad assessment of performance both against pre-set targets and more generally, of the wider universe of stakeholders. With respect to financial performance measures, this assessment will include consideration of the
quality of how particular outcomes were achieved.iii. The AIP remains a discretionary arrangement and the Remuneration Committee reserves discretion to adjust the outturn (from zero to any cap) should it consider that to be appropriate. In particular, the
Remuneration Committee may operate this discretion in respect of any risk concerns.
Changes from previous policy
- Increased the minimum level of compulsory deferral from 33% to 40%.
- Confirmed that financial performance measures will always have at least a 50% weighting for any year.
- Provides for the automatic making of DBSS awards on the fourth dealing day following the announcement of annual results.
Element and purposeLong-Term Incentive Plan ('LTIP')To motivate and incentivise delivery of sustained performance over the long term, and to promote alignment with shareholders' interests, the Group operates the Phoenix Group Holdings Long-Term Incentive
Plan
Policy and operation- Awards under the LTIP may be in any of the forms of awards to receive shares for nil-cost (as described for DBSS above).- LTIP awards are made automatically each year on the fourth dealing day following the announcement of annual
results, using the average of the preceding three dealing days' share prices to calculate the number of shares in awards.- The vesting period will be at least three years and run until the third anniversary of the award date (unless a longer vesting
period is introduced).- A holding period will apply so that Executive Directors may not normally exercise vested LTIP awards until the fifth anniversary of the award date.- Dividend entitlements will accrue until the end of the holding period in respect
of performance-vested shares and be delivered as additional vesting shares.- Malus/clawback provisions apply on a basis consistent with the equivalent provisions in the AIP and DBSS and as explained in the notes to this table.- The Company will honour
the vesting of all awards granted under previous policies in accordance with the terms of such awards.
Maximum- The formal limit under the LTIP is 300% of base salary per annum (and 400% per annum in exceptional cases).- The Remuneration Committee's practice is to make LTIP awards to Executive Directors each year over shares with a value (as at the award
date) of 200% of the individual's annual base salary although discretion is reserved to make awards up to the maximum levels for the policy as stated above.
Performance measures- The Remuneration Committee may set such performance measures for LTIP awards as it considers appropriate (whether financial or non-financial and whether corporate, divisional or individual). The Remuneration Committee would expect to
consult with its major shareholders if it proposed changing materially the current performance measures applied for LTIP awards made to Executive Directors or the relative weightings between these performance measures.- For every LTIP award, appropriate
disclosures regarding the proposed performance conditions will be made in the annual Implementation Report.- Once set, performance measures and targets will generally remain unaltered unless events occur which, in the Remuneration Committee's opinion,
make it appropriate to make adjustments to the performance measures, provided that any adjusted performance measure is, in its opinion, neither materially more nor less difficult to satisfy than the original measure.- For each part of an LTIP award
subject to a specific performance condition, the threshold level of vesting is 25% of that part of the LTIP award. The Remuneration Committee reserves the discretion to make changes to these levels which it considers non-material.- The performance period
for LTIP awards will be at least three years, but the Remuneration Committee reserves discretion to lengthen the applicable performance periods for LTIP awards.
Changes from previous policy
- Provides for the automatic making of LTIP awards on the fourth dealing day following the announcement of annual results.
- Recognises the introduction of holding periods on LTIP awards since the previous policy was approved (holding periods have applied to all
LTIP awards for Executive Directors since 2015).
- Confirms that material changes to either the current performance measures or the relative weightings of such measures would be subject to
consultation with major shareholders.
Element and purposeAll-employee share plansTo encourage share ownership by employees, thereby allowing them to participate in the long-term success of the Group and align their interests with those of the shareholders
Policy and operation- Executive Directors are able to participate in all-employee share plans on the same terms as other Group employees as required by HMRC legislation.
Maximum- Sharesave - the Remuneration Committee has the facility to allow individuals to save up to a maximum of £500 each month (or such other level as permitted by HMRC legislation) for a fixed period of three or five years. At the end of the savings
period, individuals may use their savings to buy ordinary shares in the Company at a discount of up to 20% of the market price set at the launch of each scheme.- Share Incentive Plan ('SIP') - the Remuneration Committee has the facility to allow
individuals to have the opportunity to purchase, out of their pre-tax salary, shares in the Company and receive up to two matching shares for every purchased share. Maximum saving is £150 each month (or up to such level as permitted by the Company in line
with HMRC legislation). SIP also has the facility to allow for reinvestment of dividends in further shares, or the award of additional free shares (up to the limits as permitted by HMRC legislation).
Performance measures- Consistent with normal practice, such awards are not subject to performance conditions.
Changes from previous policy No material changes.
Element and purposeShareholding guidelinesTo encourage share ownership by the Executive Directors and ensure interests are aligned
Policy and operation- Executive Directors are expected to retain all shares (net of tax) which vest under the DBSS and under the LTIP (or any other discretionary long-term incentive arrangement introduced in the future) until such time as they hold a
minimum of 200% of their base salary in shares.- Only beneficially owned shares and vested share awards (discounted for anticipated tax liabilities) may be counted for the purposes of the guidelines. Share awards do not count prior to vesting (including
DBSS awards).- Once shareholding guidelines have been met, individuals are expected to retain these levels as a minimum. The Remuneration Committee will review shareholdings annually in the context of this policy.
Maximum- N/A
Performance measures- N/A
Changes from previous policy No material changes.
Element and purposeChairman and Non-Executive Director fees
Policy and operation- The fees paid to the Chairman and the fees of the other Non-Executive Directors are set to be competitive with other listed companies of equivalent size and complexity. - Fee levels are periodically reviewed. The Company does not
adopt a quantitative approach to pay positioning and exercises judgement as to what it considers to be reasonable in all the circumstances as regards quantum.- Additional fees are paid to Non-Executive Directors who chair a Board committee, or sit on the
board of a subsidiary company or on the Solvency II Model Governance Committee, and to the Senior Independent Director ('SID'). No separate Board committee membership fees are currently paid.- Fees are paid monthly in cash.- Fee levels for Non-Executive
Directors are reviewed annually with any changes normally taking effect from 1 January.
Maximum- The aggregate fees of the Chairman and Non-Executive Directors will not exceed the limit from time to time prescribed within the Company's Articles of Association for such fees (currently £2 million per annum in aggregate).- The Company reserves
the right to vary the structure of fees within this limit including, for example, introducing time-based fees or reflecting the establishment of new board committees.
Performance measures- N/A
Changes from previous policy No material changes.
Element and purpose
Chairman and Non-Executive Director fees
Policy and operation- The fees paid to the Chairman and the fees of the other Non-Executive Directors are set to be
competitive with other listed companies of equivalent size and complexity. - Fee levels are periodically reviewed. The
Company does not adopt a quantitative approach to pay positioning and exercises judgement as to what it considers to be
reasonable in all the circumstances as regards quantum.- Additional fees are paid to Non-Executive Directors who chair a
Board committee, or sit on the board of a subsidiary company or on the Solvency II Model Governance Committee, and to the
Senior Independent Director ('SID'). No separate Board committee membership fees are currently paid.- Fees are paid
monthly in cash.- Fee levels for Non-Executive Directors are reviewed annually with any changes normally taking effect
from 1 January.
Maximum- The aggregate fees of the Chairman and Non-Executive Directors will not exceed the limit from time to time
prescribed within the Company's Articles of Association for such fees (currently £2 million per annum in aggregate).- The
Company reserves the right to vary the structure of fees within this limit including, for example, introducing time-based
fees or reflecting the establishment of new board committees.
Performance measures- N/A
Changes from previous policy No material changes.
Notes to the Remuneration Policy table
1. Differences between the Policy on Remuneration for Directors and the Policy on Remuneration of other employees
When determining Executive Directors' remuneration, the Committee takes into account pay throughout the Group to ensure
that the arrangements in place remain appropriate.
The Group has (as required by Solvency II regulations) one consistent reward policy for all levels of employees and this
policy is made available to all staff. Therefore, the same reward principles guide reward decisions for all Group
employees, including Executive Directors, although remuneration packages differ to take into account appropriate factors in
different areas of the business:
- AIP - all Group employees participate in the AIP, although the quantum and balance of corporate to individual
objectives varies by level. The most senior staff are subject to the regulatory requirements of Solvency II, and these
individuals also receive part of their bonus in Company shares deferred for a period of three years. A different scorecard
of AIP performance measures applies for employees in 'control functions' (risk, compliance and internal audit) to exclude
financial performance measures.
- LTIP - our most senior employees participate in the LTIP currently based on the same performance conditions as those
for Executive Directors, although the Committee reserves the discretion to vary the performance conditions for awards made
to employees below the Board for future awards.
- All-employee share plans - the Committee considers it is important for all employees to have the opportunity to
become shareholders in the Company. The Company offers two HMRC tax advantaged arrangements in which all UK employees can
participate and acquire shares on a discounted and tax advantaged basis (Sharesave and SIP). In recent years, the terms of
both plans have been made more generous to encourage employee take-up (increasing the Sharesave discount to 20% and in 2017
increasing the SIP match from 1 for 6 to 1 for 3). In addition, selected individuals may receive ad hoc share awards
contingent on continued employment.
2. Stating maximum amounts for the Remuneration Policy
The DRR regulations and related investor guidance encourages companies to disclose a cap within which each element of
remuneration policy will operate. Although the Company is not subject to these provisions, the Remuneration Committee has
decided to set and disclose limits in this report on a voluntary basis. Where maximum amounts for elements of remuneration
have been set within the Remuneration Policy, these will operate simply as caps and are not indicative of any aspiration.
3. Malus and clawback
Malus (being the forfeiture of unvested awards) and clawback (being the ability of the Company to claim repayment of paid
amounts as a debt) provisions apply to the AIP, DBSS and LTIP. These provisions may be applied where the Remuneration
Committee considers it appropriate to do so following:
- a review of the conduct, capability or performance of an individual;
- a review of the performance of the Company or a Group member;
- any material misstatement of the Company's or a Group member's financial results for any period;
- any material failure of risk management by an individual, a Group member or the Company; or
- any other circumstances that have a sufficiently significant impact on the reputation of the Company.
4. Travel and hospitality
While the Remuneration Committee does not consider this to form part of benefits in the normal usage of that term, it has
been advised that corporate hospitality (whether paid for by the Company or another) and certain instances of business
travel (including any related tax liabilities settled by the Company or another Group company) for Directors may
technically be considered as benefits and so the Remuneration Committee expressly reserves the right to authorise such
activities and reimbursement of associated expenses within its agreed policies.
5. Discretions reserved in operating incentive plans
The Remuneration Committee will operate the AIP, DBSS and LTIP according to their respective rules and the above
Remuneration Policy table. The Remuneration Committee retains certain discretions, consistent with market practice, in
relation to the operation and administration of these plans including:
- (as described in the Remuneration Policy table) the determination of performance measures and targets and resultant
vesting and pay-out levels;
- (as described in the Remuneration Policy table) the ability to adjust performance measures and targets to reflect
events and/or to ensure the performance measures and targets operate as originally intended;
- (as described in the Termination Policy section below) determination of the treatment of individuals who leave
employment, based on the rules of the incentive plans, and the treatment of the incentive plans on exceptional events, such
as a change of control of the Company; and
- the ability to make adjustments to existing awards made under the incentive plans in certain circumstances (e.g.
rights issues, corporate restructurings or special dividends).
Recruitment remuneration policy
The Company's recruitment remuneration policy aims to give the Remuneration Committee sufficient flexibility to secure the
appointment and promotion of high calibre executives to strengthen the management team and secure the skill sets to deliver
our strategic aims.
- In terms of the principles for setting a package for a new Executive Director, the starting point for the
Remuneration Committee will be to apply the general policy for Executive Directors as set out above and structure a package
in accordance with that policy. Consistent with the DRR regulations, the caps contained within the policy for fixed pay do
not apply to new recruits, although the Remuneration Committee would not envisage exceeding these caps in practice.
- The AIP and LTIP will operate (including the maximum award levels) as detailed in the general policy in relation to
any newly appointed Executive Director.
- For an internal appointment, any variable pay element awarded in respect of the prior role may either continue on
its original terms or be adjusted to reflect the new appointment as appropriate.
- For external and internal appointments, the Remuneration Committee may agree that the Company will meet certain
relocation expenses as it considers appropriate.
- For external candidates, it may be necessary to make awards in connection with the recruitment to buy-out awards
forfeited by the individual on leaving a previous employer. For such buy-out awards, Phoenix Group will not pay more than
is, in the view of the Remuneration Committee, necessary and will in all cases seek, in the first instance, to deliver any
such awards under the terms of the existing incentive pay structure. It may, however, be necessary in some cases to make
such awards on terms that are more bespoke than the existing annual and equity-based pay structures in Phoenix in order to
secure a candidate. Details of any buy-out awards will be appropriately disclosed.
- All such buy-out awards, whether under the AIP, LTIP or otherwise (for example, specific arrangements made under
Listing Rule 9.4.2), will take account of the service obligations and performance requirements for any remuneration
relinquished by the individual when leaving a previous employer. The Remuneration Committee will seek to make buy-out
awards subject to what are, in its opinion, comparable requirements in respect of service and performance. However, the
Remuneration Committee may choose to relax this requirement in certain cases (such as where the service and/or performance
requirements are materially completed), and where the Remuneration Committee considers it to be in the interests of
shareholders and where such factors are, in the view of the Remuneration Committee, reflected in some other way, such as a
significant discount to the face value of the awards forfeited. Exceptionally, where necessary, this may include a
guaranteed or non pro-rated annual incentive in the year of joining.
- For the avoidance of doubt, such buy-out awards are not subject to a formal cap.
- A new Non-Executive Director would be recruited on the terms explained in the Remuneration Policy for such
Directors.
Directors' service contracts
Executive Directors
Executive Director service contracts, which do not contain expiry dates, provide that compensation provisions for
termination without notice will only extend to 12 months of salary, certain fixed benefits and pension (which may be
payable in instalments and subject to mitigation). By excluding any entitlement to compensation for loss of the opportunity
to earn variable pay, the Remuneration Committee believes the contracts to be consistent with best practice. The
Remuneration Committee also has discretion to mitigate further by paying on a phased basis with unpaid instalments ceasing
after the initial period of six months if the Executive Director finds alternative employment. Contracts do not contain
change of control provisions. The template contract is reviewed from time-time and may be amended provided it is not
overall more generous than the terms described above.
Subject to Board approval, Executive Directors are permitted to accept outside appointments on external boards as long as
these are not deemed to interfere with the business of the Group.
Non-Executive Directors
The Non-Executive Directors, including the Chairman, have letters of appointment which set out their duties and
responsibilities. Appointment is for an initial fixed term of three years (which may be renewed), terminable by one month's
notice from either side (six months in the case of the Chairman). Non-Executive Directors are not eligible to participate
in incentive arrangements or receive pension provision or other benefits such as private medical insurance and life
insurance.
Termination policy summary
In practice, the facts surrounding any termination do not always fit neatly into defined categories for good or bad
leavers. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Remuneration Committee to consider the suitable treatment on a termination
having regard to all of the relevant facts and circumstances available at that time. This policy applies both to any
negotiations linked to notice periods on a termination and any treatment which the Remuneration Committee may choose to
apply under the discretions available to it under the terms of the AIP, DBSS and LTIP plans. The potential treatments on
termination under these plans are summarised below.
Incentives Good Leaver1 Bad Leaver Exceptional Events
A participant is considered a Good Leaver if leaving through redundancy, serious ill health or death or otherwise at the A participant would typically be considered a Bad Leaver following a voluntary resignation or leaving for disciplinary reasons For example change in control or
discretion of the Remuneration Committee winding-up of the Company
AIP Pro-rated annual incentive. Pro-rating to reflect only the period worked. Performance metrics determined by the Remuneration No awards made Either the AIP will continue for the year or there will be a pro-rated annual incentive. Performance metrics determined by the Remuneration Committee
Committee
DBSS Deferred awards vest at the end of the original vesting period Deferred awards normally lapse Deferred awards vest
LTIP Will receive a pro-rated award subject to the application of the performance conditions at the normal measurement date and, All awards will normally lapse Will receive a pro-rated award subject to the application of the performance conditions at the date of the event. Remuneration Committee discretion to disapply pro-rating
generally, any holding period will continue to applyRemuneration Committee discretion to disapply pro-rating or to accelerate
vesting to the date of leaving (subject to pro-rating and performance conditions) and/or the release of any holding period
1 Where the reason for leaving is retirement, the individual will be required to provide confirmation of his continued
retirement before any payments are released to him after the end of the vesting period.
The Company has power to enter into settlement agreements with executives and to pay compensation to settle potential legal
claims. In addition, and consistent with market practice, in the event of termination of an Executive Director, the Company
may pay a contribution towards the individual's legal fees and fees for outplacement services as part of a negotiated
settlement. Any such fees would be disclosed as part of the detail of termination arrangements. For the avoidance of doubt,
the policy does not include an explicit cap on the cost of termination payments.
In the event of cessation of a Non-Executive Director's appointment (excluding the Chairman) they would be entitled to a
one month's notice period. The Chairman, as detailed in his letter of appointment, would be entitled to a six months'
notice period.
Potential rewards under various scenarios
The potential total rewards available to the Executive Directors, ignoring any change in share price and roll-up of
dividends are:
Group Chief Executive Officer - Clive Barrister
Minimum 100% 856
On-target 50% 30% 20% 1,734
Maximum 26% 32% 42% 3,309
Group Finance director - James McConville
Minimum 100% 544
On-target 50% 30% 20% 1,097
Maximum 26% 32% 42% 2,087
The above chart aims to show how the Remuneration Policy set out above for Executive Directors is applied using the
following assumptions.
Minimum Consists of base salary, benefits and pensionBase salary is the salary to be paid in 2017Benefits measured as benefits paid in 2016 as set out in the single figure table. Pension measured as the 20% of base salary receivable either as a pension contribution or as cash, and ignoring the reduction to payments made in cash for employers' national insurance contributions
Name Base salary Benefits Pension Total fixed
£000 £000 £000 £000
Clive Bannister 700 16 140 856
James McConville 440 16 88 544
On-target Based on what the Executive Director would receive if performance was on-target: -
AIP: consists of the on-target annual incentive (75% of base salary).LTIP: consists
of the threshold level of vesting (50% of base salary). The benefit of a single
year's participation in the Sharesave scheme is recognised using an expected value
for the Sharesave options of 30%. The benefit of a single year's participation in the
SIP is recognised using one matching share for every three shares invested on the
maximum value which can be invested.
Maximum Based on the maximum remuneration receivable:- AIP: consists of the maximum annual
incentive (150% of base salary).LTIP: assumes maximum vesting of awards and valued as
on the date of grant (normal award 200% of base salary) Sharesave and SIP valued on
the same basis as in the on-target row.
Consideration of employment conditions elsewhere in the Group
As explained in the notes to the Remuneration Policy table, the Remuneration Committee takes into account Group-wide pay
and employment conditions. The Remuneration Committee reviews the average Group-wide base salary increase and annual
incentive costs and is responsible for all discretionary and all-employee share arrangements.
Consistent with normal practice, the Remuneration Committee did not consult with employees in preparing the Remuneration
Policy.
The Remuneration Committee is cognisant of the requests from, amongst others, the Investment Association, for companies to
publish ratios comparing CEO to employee pay. The Remuneration Committee has not, however, published this data in the
Directors' Remuneration Report given the absence of a common methodology for these comparisons; the Company's expectation
is that it will publish ratios showing comparisons in future years when, as can be expected, UK regulations or guidance
develop a common methodology.
Consideration of shareholders' views
Each year the Remuneration Committee takes into account the approval levels of remuneration-related matters at our AGM in
determining that the current Remuneration Policy remains appropriate for the Company.
The Remuneration Committee also seeks to build an active and productive dialogue with investors on developments in the
remuneration aspects of corporate governance generally and any changes to the Company's executive pay arrangements in
particular. The Remuneration Committee consulted with its largest shareholders before proposing the changes reflected in
this Remuneration Policy.
PART B: ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT - UNAUDITED INFORMATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF REMUNERATION POLICY IN 2017
Element of Remuneration Policy Detail of Implementation of Policy for 2017
Base Salary Salaries in 2017 will remain unchanged at £700,000 for the Group Chief Executive Officer (unchanged from 2011) and £440,000 for the Group Finance Director (unchanged from 2014).
Benefits There are no proposed changes to the benefits offered to Executive Directors in 2017.
Pension There are no proposed changes to the pension benefits offered to Executive Directors in 2017.
Annual Incentive Plan ('AIP') The AIP for 2017 will operate on a basis that is consistent with how the AIP operated in 2016, although there have been changes to the precise measures and weightings of the Corporate (financial and strategic) performance measures for 2017's AIP to reflect our evolving business focus. The AIP maximum potential and on-target levels remain unchanged at 150% of base salary and at 50% of maximum levels (75% of base salary) respectively.The overall weightings between Corporate and Personal performance measures for AIP in 2017 are unchanged from 2016:- Corporate (financial and strategic) performance measures - 70%.Personal (individual objectives) - 30%.
The weightings of the AIP performance measures for 2017 are summarised below:
Performance measure % of incentive potential
Corporate measure
Operating companies' cash generation 50%
Customer experience 20%
Personal
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