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Source: Reuters
Description: By fostering the collapse of property developer Evergrande, the
Chinese president is effectively transitioning the country from “unstable,
unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable” growth to a new economic system
under his absolute command, Edward Chancellor tells Rob Cox.
Short Link: https://refini.tv/3zV7BVF
Video Transcript:
What Xi, I think, is looking for is what he calls the ‘Chinese
Dream’, it’s really the re-imposition of something that looks quite
like communist rule, not capitalism. Or if you want to be more
historic-minded, quite like old Imperial China, say from the Qin Dynasty of
the second century BC.
Welcome to another Breakout with Breakingviews brought to you by PGIM.
I’m Rob Cox, coming to you from Milan, speaking to Edward Chancellor in
the UK. Eddie, you've written a column about Evergrande. You basically said
that this Chinese property company is all of China's economic ills in one
company. Elaborate a little bit further. What are those ills?
Premier Wen Jiabao, about 13 years ago, commented on China's economy being
unbalanced, unsustainable. And I think, the point is that even Wen made that
comment then, there were already signs that there was too much debt in China's
economy that was growth was driven by excessive investment and excessive
credit. President Xi Jinping has been aware of this for a while and in
particular, he's been aware that the property bubble was at the center of
China's unbalanced economic growth. And what's interesting is, a few years
back, Wen said he was particularly infuriated by the large numbers of millions
of vacant properties held in China, kept empty in China by investors. And Wen
said, I'm sorry, Xi said that the property houses were for living in, not for
speculation. And nobody paid any attention. And then last year, during the
pandemic, the housing market, China's housing market, soared again, going up,
I think, more than 15% over the course of the year. And towards the end of
that year, I think Xi took a decision saying enough was enough. And it was
then that he introduced the so-called ‘Three red lines’ to limit
property developers’ use of leverage. And those three red lines, as you
know, are what have, in the end, brought Evergrande, China's largest property
developer with some $300 billion of debts, to its knees. And my thinking is
that this is a deliberate attempt by Xi to bust the housing bubble.
Okay, so he's bursting the housing bubble in this build-up of excess
investment. Where does he take the economy? If we're going from a bubble
economy, what's the sort of next version of that? Is it socialism with Chinese
characteristics or is it just a sort of Xi Jinping absolute authority economy?
What does that look like?
Well, Rob, I think before you get to that point, you have to consider the
risks of bursting the bubble. And as I say in my piece, no significant real
estate bubble has ever been burst in the past without A, a severe economic
downturn and often a financial crisis to boot. And think- the poster child for
that is the Japan's bubble economy that was deliberately burst in the late in
1989 by the Bank of Japan. And then Japan had its banking crisis and so-called
lost decade. Now, I think Xi thinks two things. First of all, he thinks I can
control the bubble burst better than Japan. And you know, what they do in
China is that when a company, a private company or any company, has losses,
those losses tend to get shuffled around the system. That's what the Chinese
are extremely good at doing. And Xi can choose where those losses appear. We
call that ‘Red capitalism’. And so, I think he thinks he can deflate
the bubble and the bad debts produced by the bubble in a better way than
Japan. The other thing is, I think he has a vision of the future. He
doesn’t want China's economy to be driven anymore by excessive investment
and excessive credit. The China 2025 development plan is for Chinese to lead
in a whole load of new technologies from sort of artificial intelligence to
aeronautics, biotechnology, and so forth. And I think if you look at what Xi
has been doing in recent years, he's been developing a system of social
credits that seem to sort of run alongside a normal credit. If you behave
well, you're allowed to, you get priority access onto a plane. If you behave
badly, you suddenly can't get onto one of these high-speed trains. He's
developing a digital Yuan in which every transaction by the individual would
be followed by the state. In China now, there are some 600 million
surveillance cameras all electronically connected together and feeding a huge
amount of big data. So, I think what Xi, I think, is looking for is what he
calls the ‘Chinese Dream’. It’s really the re-imposition of
something that looks quite like communist rule, not capitalism. Or if you want
to be more historic-minded, quite like old Imperial China, say from the Ming
Dynasty of the 16th century. Or if you really want to go back, to the Qin
Dynasty of the second century BC. So, in other words, a very authoritarian
type of economic model that I think we can no longer describe as capitalistic
or marketized.
So, what are the implications for foreign investors in China?
Well, that’s scary. I think, immediately, the consequences of the
bursting of the housing bubble are deflationary. I mean, that's if you
remember what we learned from the sort of Lehman bust. I think that there's a
possibility, if the central bank tries to offset these deflationary forces, by
printing a lot of money, that the Renminbi will crack on the foreign
exchanges. And if that happens, then I think, as I said in the piece,
we’re going to unleash another trade war. So those are sort of the
immediate consequences and I’d throw in the fact that raw material prices
globally are likely to suffer. But I think longer-term, western investors have
to consider how protected are they going to be in Xi’s surveillance
state. And we've seen over the course of recent months, Alibaba, DiDi, the
education companies last week, the cryptocurrencies, whatever doesn't fit with
Xi’s plan, gets whacked and gets whacked sort of pretty big time. So, I
think that the, what we used to call the ‘China Dream’, the dream of
western investors, that they can make huge amounts of money from the
potentially vast China market, this is a dream that comes about, it thrived in
the 1930s, it comes and goes, and since the opening of China in 1979, the
China Dream has been alive. I think that China Dream has come to an end and
that is to be replaced by Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ and the
Chinese Dream is an authoritarian, collectivist, and fundamentally
anti-capitalist vision.
Alright. Well thank you, Eddie, for your insights into that. We'll be back
with another Breakout from Breakingviews next week