By Sarah Wu and Yimou Lee
TAIPEI, March 15 (Reuters) - Taiwan is scrambling to
secure its communications with the outside world against an
attack by China, but even in peacetime cannot quickly repair
critical undersea internet cables and lacks suitable satellite
backups, experts and officials say.
China, which has never renounced the use of force to bring
Taiwan under its control, has ramped up military and political
efforts to force the democratically governed island to accept
its sovereignty.
The Ukraine war has lent new urgency to Taiwan's efforts to
bolster its security, especially against Chinese cyber attacks
or attempts to sever any of 14 cables that connect it to the
global internet.
"Strategic communications, internally and externally, is
what keeps us up at night, particularly in the aftermath of
Ukraine," said Tzeng Yisuo, an analyst at Taiwan's top military
think tank, the Institute for National Defence and Security
Research.
Taiwan has zeroed in on low-Earth orbit satellites as a
solution, and has launched a two-year trial programme to boost
internet services by leaning on international satellite
providers.
Taiwan's total satellite bandwidth is about 0.02% of what
its undersea cables provide, according to Kenny Huang, chief
executive at Taiwan Network Information Center, the island's
internet domain manager.
Huang said Taiwan has struggled to attract interest from
international satellite companies because of strict regulations
on ownership, which limit foreign shares to a maximum of 49%,
and a lack of financial sweeteners.
"There's little incentive for them (foreign companies)," he
said. "Regulations must be changed."
Defence experts say that although Taiwan can draw lessons
from Ukraine's use of Starlink, a satellite network developed by
Elon Musk's U.S.-based space exploration company SpaceX, they
worry about relying on a commercial actor with business
interests in China.
"Elon Musk, we are not certain if he cares more about
China's market," Tzeng said, referring to Tesla's sales in
China. "We won't put all our eggs in one basket."
Taiwan does not own any Starlink terminals. SpaceX did not
respond to a request for comment.
Taiwan is also strengthening the resilience of wartime
communication channels for top commanders, including the
president, according to one senior government official and
another person familiar with government efforts.
"We are taking notes from Zelenskiy," a senior Taiwan
security official said, referring to Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskiy's strong presence on social media.
Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs said in a statement
that it would prioritise Taiwan's offshore islands for the
satellite trial programme and would further increase the
bandwidth for microwave communications with outlying islands by
year-end. The ministry did not comment on sea cables or
repairing them.
SECURING UNDERSEA CABLES
Taiwan's vulnerability was thrown into focus last month when
the two undersea cables connecting the Taiwan-controlled Matsu
islands, which sit close to the Chinese coast, were cut,
disconnecting the 14,000 people who live there from the
internet.
Authorities said that their initial findings show a Chinese
fishing vessel and a Chinese freighter caused the disruption,
but that there was no evidence Beijing deliberately tampered
with the cables. China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not
immediately respond to a request for comment.
Chunghwa Telecom switched on a backup microwave system that
transmits signals from the top of a mountain in Taipei to Matsu,
but that only restored about 5% of the bandwidth that the cables
had provided.
This month, the government upgraded the system and internet
speed significantly improved. But because there are few cable
repair ships in the region, residents must wait until late April
for internet access to be fully restored.
A senior Taiwan official familiar with security matters said
that sea cable vulnerability has long been a national security
concern, and that it was "ridiculous" so little progress had
been made to address the issue. The person declined to be named
because of the sensitivity of the matter.
"We can't even fix sea cables on our own," the official
said.
Lii Wen, who leads the Matsu branch of the ruling Democratic
Progressive Party, described the February outage as a "warning"
to Taiwan.
"Today, it's Matsu's sea cables that broke," he said. "What
if one day all 14 of Taiwan's undersea cables connecting us to
the outside world break? Will we be adequately prepared?"
China will probably take aim at Taiwan's sea cables or the
cable landing stations before an all-out attack, experts say, a
move that would cause panic, paralyse commercial activity, and
help Beijing gain control over the international narrative.
China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not respond to a request
for comment.
Taiwan's military has long prepared back-up plans, including
a fibre-optic network for communications within Taiwan,
satellites, high-frequency radio, and microwave systems.
The impact on civilians would be severe regardless, and
authorities are reinforcing Taiwan's four entry points for
international sea cables and running more frequent war
simulations involving them, Huang said.
"In a state of emergency, people will want to get
information," said Chieh Chung, a military researcher at the
National Policy Foundation, a Taipei-based think tank. "If they
can't get information, people's panic will spread."
Cutting off communications and causing chaos would not be
the only military effects of severing the cables, Huang said.
Taiwan might find it difficult to calibrate a response to such a
move that an aggressor couldn't use to justify an all-out
attack.
"So the first step (for China) - with about 99 percent
likelihood - is to cut our sea cables," Huang said.
(Reporting by Yimou Lee and Sarah Wu. Editing by Gerry Doyle)
((S.Wu@thomsonreuters.com;))