BP vs the US Criminal Justice System
The legal battle that will determine whether BP (LON:BP.) survives has only just begun. The result will hinge on whether someone or more than someone, employed directly or indirectly by BP in the drilling operation prior to the blow-out did something that was “negligent”, or “reckless”, or not done strictly in accordance with the approved safety procedures and the myriad of regulations mandated by this or that agency.That sounds like a replay of the credit crunch. Then there were laws, lots of laws and yet there was an unmitigated disaster.
In any case if Exxon's (NYSE:XON) Valdez experience is any guide, it could take a while…like twenty years. But that’s better than India, over there they only just handed down verdicts on the 1984 Bophal disaster, here’s a report from last week:
Seven former senior employees of Union Carbide’s Indian subsidiary were convicted today of “death by negligence” for their roles in the Bhopal gas tragedy which killed an estimated 15,000 people.
The way the maximum sentence was seven years in prison, and hardly any of the families of the victims ever received compensation. That was thanks to the local laws which mandated the nasty foreign company was forced to buy insurance from a local Indian company which was not obliged to re-insure, and which had a clever clause that meant they didn’t have to pay anyone until it could be proven that there had been no “crime”.
If no “criminal” negligence can be proven, then under the 1990 Oil Pollution Act the maximum that BP will be liable to pay for “economic damage” will be $75 million.
You can disperse oil using chemicals but that causes environmental damage and in any case all that does is create clouds of “dispersed” oil droplets under the surface, even though the surface of the water is sparkling “clean”. That’s what all those clouds of oil droplets below the surface that are drifting into the Gulf Stream are all about, BP was very smart they started spraying dispersants at the source, so the oild never reached the surface. That doesn’t mean it’s not there, just it’s a whole lot harder to spot.
With regard to the rest, the Exxon trials lasted twenty years and the verdict relied mainly on the fact that the captain was drunk and of course, Exxon should not have employed a captain who was a drunk. Is there an angle lurking that a clever legal team could use? One word spoken in jest on the thousands of hours of recorded transmissions might make all the difference. The race is on to find the golden sound-bite.
If that fails, there is always the fall-back of the alleged “culture of blatant disregard of safety”, that means all of BP’s past crimes will be sifted through and paraded in the worst possible light so they can be “taken into consideration”. But that will all be academic if Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez’s bill to retroactively raise the liability limit for impacts like lost wages or dwindling tourism to $10 billion; passes into law.
The cost of economic damage can be roughly calculated from the past records of the turnover of affected industries, although there is an element of “art” in that. But economic value of ecological damage is something else, there you just think of a number; who knows the “economic-cost” of making some species of toad extinct, who can prove that clouds of dispersed oil droplets poisoned spawning ground, or even that the oil that mysteriously surfaced, or was deposited a thousand miles from the “event”, was that cause? If “recklessness”, or “negligence” can be proved the potential “number” is potentially infinite. That’s why BP has lost more than $50 billion off its market cap since the blow-out.
But all of that pales into insignificance when compared to another sort of economic damage, which is far more pervasive than either the direct economic damage (from the affected fishermen and the supply-chain that is supported by them), and the tourism industry. That is how much Americans pay for “safety”.
Safety is a huge business in the developed world, particularly America. When President Bush was elected all he could talk about was a Star Wars Super-Missile defence system that would have cost at least a trillion dollars, and would, according to him, have “keept America safe”. That plan was shelved after the 9/11 attack which would still have been “successful” (to the perpetrators), even after the trillion dollars on Star Wars had been spent. But no worries, Bush got his trillion dollars and counting to “punish” the perpetrators, or more to the point, the “known associates” of the perpetrators, like the 350,000 women and children that the Lancet says died in Iraq. Although whether on not Americans are sleeping sounder in their beds after that delicious extravaganza of Rambo Revenge; is debatable. If they are not, then the money was wasted.
The American system of law relies on the idea of crime and punishment. It is moral hazard on speed…”if you can’t do the time don’t do the crime”; punishment not prevention is what creates “order”. That’s why USA has the largest prison population of any developed nation, thanks in part to the “War on Drugs”, where the crime is to take drugs because that might make you a less “orderly” member of society. Plus three-strikes and you’re out; plus the one of the highest rates of execution per capita in any developed country, comparable with the rate in China and Saudi Arabia. Does that prove Americans, in general, are more “criminal” than other people? Moral hazard is all very well in principle but it can have “unintended” consequences. The first is that “safety rules” piled on top of more safety rules costs an extraordinary amount of money.
One of the reasons that Americans pay much more for drugs and for medical treatment than anyone else in the world pays for the same drugs and the same procedures, are the “safety” rules that are supposed to provide a superior level of protection to Americans, with the emphasis placed always of retroactively finding the “criminal”, and “punishing” him (and sometimes her), by putting a big hand in their pocket, and the pockets of any “known associates”.
As if the workers on the Horizon rig deliberately and criminally blew it (and themselves) up. Under the normal definition of a “crime”, a worker would have deliberately sabotaged the blow-out preventer and the cementation job. But would that have been the responsibility of BP? Or perhaps an executive in BP gave an order that he knew would have caused the rig to blow up. But there again, the Tool-pusher and the captain of the rig had a legal responsibility to refuse to action any order that they considered might jeopardize the crew?
The way that oil-field work is administered in USA is different from in the North Sea. In USA you have volumes and volumes of rules and laws, and if you can persuade the authorities that you comply with them, then you can do what you want. In the North Sea (particularly after the Alpha Bravo disaster), it’s up to the operator to prove to the satisfaction of the authorities that any new procedure is safe. Yet there was plenty of evidence that the approaches to cementation that were commonly used ion the Gulf of Mexico; were not foolproof. Regardless, they conformed to the code and the law. But the authorities carried a “Big Stick”, crime and punishment. That was supposed to be the ultimate guarantor of safety. It wasn’t.
Whether BP is made bankrupt or whether the hoteliers and fishermen in Louisiana and Florida are made bankrupt by the disaster, or both; is academic. America as a whole is going to be paying more for oil in the future, regardless of what happens, and regardless of who, if anyone goes to jail, that won’t change.
There are other ways to handle the unforseen (but not totally unexpected) consequences of dangerous jobs. It’s exactly the same principle from doing medicine (dangerous for the customers), to driving cars (dangerous for Toyota), writing mortgages (dangerous for banks), building nuclear power station (stalled in USA for twenty years because of safety concerns), to drilling oil wells. The first is to create a blame-free co-operation between the authorities and the industry that looks further than how to identify and punish a “perpetrator” in the case of an accident. The second is to mandate contingency plans for “worst-case”.
One lesson learned from the BP spill is that the company was completely unprepared to deal with a disaster of this magnitude. Absolutely no thought had been given to what would need to be done, if there was an uncontrolled leak 5,000 feet under-water. The capping device that is now in place had not even been thought about on the day the rig blew up, yet it’s pretty obvious that one solution if the BOP fails is to cut off the riser and place a cap. Why wasn’t that device, engineered properly (BP say they are coming up with a better model), on standby and in place? It’s not as if this is the first time an oil well has blown. Just because it was 5,000 ft below the surface did not make it “special”.
Insofar as the spill is concerned, there are plenty of skimmers that can operate in eight-ft waves that could have, if deployed in sufficient numbers, have skimmed off the oil from the surface (i.e. without relying on dispersants which essentially just hide the problem under-water). Why were one hundred of those devices not deployed on standby within three days sailing along with tenders plus if necessary inflating bags to temporarily hold the oil. Those “mothers” can pick up 5,000 barrels of oil a day; and they can be dragged around using a GPS mandated routing controlled from the air. In a word they were not built.
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/36395/
Although to be fair there were some skimmers (less effective than the ones not built) available in Holland, UK, and Norway, and they were offered. But the offer of help was rejected by both the Obama Administration (on a government to government level), and by BP.
It’s hard to imagine why the Obama administration refused assistance; it’s almost as if they wanted the situation to become worse. Or perhaps it was because of the Jacobs Law which mandates that all of the oil-service vessels operating in the Gulf of Mexico; must have been made in America.
http://commonsensewonder.blogspot.com/2010/06/it-wasnt-bp-that-was-slow-to-accept-it.html
In fact BP was prevented from mobilising all of the resources that could have been mobilised to collect up the oil that had been spilled (in the mean-time while they drilled their relief well and experimented with novel ideas on the well-head), by none other than the US Government. Now that might open up an interesting legal argument in BP’s favour if ever the subject of criminal negligence gets to Court. With the US Government in the dock as the “perpetrator” who prevented BP from mobilizing all possible resources to prevent ecological and economic damage. But is that criminal?
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5 comments
Andrew
Perhaps if the Obama administration thought outside the box of gunboat diplomacy, they'd actually get an amicable result?
Just thinking aloud!!
Andrew,
There are some important elements about the industry to take into account here, not least the fact that pretty much all the operations on a rig are subcontracted out to specialist companies ad their employees.
When you say:
It's really not obvious at all - assuming we don't have today's hindsight. Yes, wells blow. And it's scary. And they're controlled, whether in minutes, hours or days. BOPs fail very rarely which means that all of the rams have failed. And if they do then there should be plans for dealing with that eventuality.
Equally importantly, the failure of the cement job, the BOPs or anything else is not the real issue here. The real issue is that the rig was lost, and wthout that, a platform from which to deal with the problem was lost as well.
As I've written elsewhere, once gas is detected then things should begin shutting all over the place. Electrical systems and engines shut down, intrinsically-safe (which is to say explosion-proof) systems are all that are left running. Now, it is not beyond young, smart and misguided engineers to bypass these systems from time-to-time and so it is possible that the escaping gas encountered a spark as it entered a zone which should have shut down. If so, then the odds are thosands-to-one that the fault lies with Transocean or another subcontractor.
But evidence we've seen so far suggests that there was a problem arising from the engines. Again, these should have shut down and if this was the source of the spark then Transocean will have their backs very firmly back against the wall.
By talking about having caps on standby you are falling into the same 'safety trap' you appear to be criticizing. There were so many things that could - and should - have prevented the rig from being lost in the first place that the idea of having a cap to deal with a flowing BOP when no rig is present was simply inconceivable.
In short, in my view the whole thing turns on the explosion and its cause. It's inconceivable in my view that the explosion can be attributed to BP.
I'd like to write more, but much of this I've covered under another thread and my time is short. A couple of picky points though: 'Alpha Bravo' was of course 'Piper Alpha' and the 'Jacobs Law' is the 'Jones Law.'
SW10, who has worked on a floater during a blowout and is still here to bore people about it.
Thank you - and thanks for the editorial.
Apologies, my "fact checker" was unavailable...can't get good help these days.
According to the story pieced together by Alan Von Altendorf ( http://seekingalpha.com/author/alan-von-altendorf?source=search_general&s=alan-von-altendorf), indeed someone had shut down the safety mechanisms because gas got sucked into the generators, then they over-revved and blew up the electrical systems.
Apparently also all of the HSE team were having a big party celebrating how many boxes they had ticked, just at the time the rig blew.
Is it inconceivable that you a get a well out of control on the sea floor?
Err...no it is not - it happened before.
Is it inconceivable that you lose your rig?
Err...no it happened before.
Since you worked in the oilfields I guess you have come across the species of flat-worm called the HSE specialist, who busy themselves making sure that you reverse-park your car and hold onto the banisters when you go down the stairs, and then wander around getting in the way carrying clip-boards and ticking boxes with a "stern" look on their faces.
Evidently they missed a box - clearly imagining the worst-case and planning for that is not part of their core competence.
By the way, since you are so knowledgable, perhaps you can explain to me why a 36" air-lift wouldn't work.
The diving and marine services company I am involved with at the moment could deploy one of them within 36 hours of getting (a) permission to operate in US waters (b) a commitment to pay us the $4,000 a barrel that BP is going to be fined for releasing.
We offered to do it at risk.
We reckon we could suck up 30,000 barrels of oil a day directly from the source, and we wouldn't need a semi, just three to four DP2.
We wrote to BP three weeks ago (never received a reply - didn't expect one), perhaps they were worried about our fee structure?
Or perhaps it's because they blacklisted us for losing a diver a year ago after reading the IMCA report that we published - (nowhere near one of their operations).
Can''t have "unsafe" practices Old Chap!!!
Hi Andrew,
That may be tongue-in-cheek, and if so then it's justified. I apologize for the terseness of my reply which was written when I really should have been doing something else.
I'm sorry - I don't know what a 36" air-lift is. Any expertise I claim to have is in E&P - but then, as I am an anonymous bulletin-board poster people are right to reserve some healthy scepticism.
Is due to the Jones law thing? It really seems extraordinary to me that this kind of barrier is allowed to persist. I would have thought that BP could neatly bring this to a head by hiring all of this stuff and then have it turned back as it reaches US territorial waters. The PR win would be immense, if nothing else, but more importantly it would force the Administration's hand.
Why don't you offer a sliding scale whereby they pay less-per-barrel for the first xx thousand barrels and then increase it as you reach various milestones? That would demonstrate your confidence and reduce their risk up front whilst you're getting your act together.
I don't thi nk they're using a semi for recovery, just for the relief wells. I'm not sure what you mean by DP2, are you referring to diving support vessels?! I'm intrigued; how would that work?
Yeah, I've kinda regretted my handle since I first started using it, which why I always drop the 'Chap' element! However, the baggage remains and I manfully try to 'own' rather disown the thing...
:-)
Respectfully,
SW10
No worries - any frustration I have is dealing with HSE and red tape.
Actually I just submitted a proposal to the Coast Guard, after getting a silly form letter from BP (called their response desk too - got someone in Madras I think), so I wrote am e-mail to the Admiral.
Amazing the difference - actually got REAL people e-mailing me back - three times in the last hour.