"The Age of Easy Oil is Over" - Is it?
Written by Robin Mills, Energy Economist and Author of 'The Myth of the Oil Crisis'
There is one thing on which almost all pundits, industry veterans, forecasting agencies and members of the public seem to agree. Energy, particularly hydrocarbons, is going to get ever scarcer and more expensive. The "age of easy oil? is over.
Former Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer opined in April 2008 that, “Easy oil and easy gas...is simply depleted” and that December, his unlikely soul-mate, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, concurred: “The era of cheap energy, including cheap gas, is coming to an end”.
Oil prices remain high by historic levels, and the continuing Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico seems to confirm the belief that the oil industry is venturing into ever more-challenging frontiers.
Business plans and economic projections are founded on the belief in the end of easy oil. It predicts a rosy future for the Middle East and Russia, drives growth in renewable energy and alternative vehicles, and leads many to worry about "peak oil?, resource wars and a collapse of industrial civilisation.
But what if this belief is wrong?
Resources in the ground are clearly abundant. Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers Vice President Greg Stringham, pointing to the 175 billion barrels recoverable from the Canadian oil sands, says, “It won't be a lack of resources that causes a shift away from oil. There's lots of oil.” The United States Geological Survey recently updated their estimates for recoverable oil from Venezuela?s Orinoco Belt to 513 billion bbl. Compare this to BP?s estimate of some 1200 billion bbl of global conventional oil reserves.
Some shale formations, such as the US?s Bakken and Eagle Ford, contain substantial amounts of oil and natural gas liquids too, a form of unconventional oil which has emerged from nowhere in the past few years.
Traditional onshore light crude, though often inaccessible to the international oil companies, remains plentiful too. We might be sceptical of Iraq?s plans to reach some 12 million barrels per day output by 2015, despite the assistance of Shell (LON:RDSA), Total (NYSE:TOT), ExxonMobil (NYSE:XOM), CNPC and others. The political, security and logistical challenges are clearly huge. But most industry observers agree that, in the longer term, the technical potential is there. Iraq?s reserves are likely to increase substantially once the supermajors start work, not to mention the almost unbroken string of discoveries in the Kurdistan region.
Next door, despite sanctions and mismanagement, exploration successes in Iran suggest substantial remaining potential: at least 21 billion bbl found since 1998 in four fields near the Iraqi border. Saudi Arabia has substantial spare capacity, while Kuwait and Abu Dhabi recently updated ambitious plans for production gains.
Non-OPEC is not slacking either. Despite high taxation, maturing fields, often outdated technology and a capricious legal environment, Russian production continues to creep up. Kazakhstan?s long-delayed Kashagan field will finally come onstream around 2013 and yield more than 1 million bbl per day. Brazil?s enormous pre-salt play continues to deliver new discoveries and is now moving into early production. At the same time, frontier exploration is finally yielding fruit, with major finds in Ghana and Uganda, and promising signs in areas such as Mozambique, the Falklands Islands and Greenland.
And we should not forget the potential of old fields. Global average recovery factors hover around 33%, but 50- 60% is often achieved in the North Sea and onshore USA, indicating a vast, low-risk prize for better reservoir management and more systematic use of enhanced oil recovery. Mature areas such as Colombia, Egypt and Oman are rebounding impressively from some years of decline.
Instead of fears that non-OPEC production had peaked, the IEA now sees output broadly flat to 2015. Admittedly, action following the Macondo blowout may hamper US deepwater production, but elsewhere in the world, higher safety standards are to be welcomed, and probably mean only moderately higher costs.
During the decade to 2009, stimulated by high oil prices, reserves increased in every region and by 23% overall, even excluding the undeveloped portions of the Canadian oil sands. Production growth, running at 1.1% annually during the 1990s, accelerated under the stimulus of Asian demand to 1.4% per year from 2000 up to the onset of the economic crisis.
As for gas, the success of US shales has demonstrated that fears earlier this decade of a shortage were wildly pessimistic. Led by technology, the industry was able to respond to high prices, and demonstrate that unconventional resources can be brought into play fast enough to make a difference. Europe, China, Australia, Indonesia, South Africa and India are now all looking seriously at shale gas and coal-bed methane.
With no OPEC to cut production, gas prices remain well below oil on an energy-equivalent basis. Remaining global gas resources may be as much as 12400-20800 Tcf, plus a more speculative 6000 Tcf of unconventional gas outside North America. At the upper end, this equates to 250 years of current production.
Add to this the enormous potential of coal gasification, the conversion of coal and gas to liquid petroleum, the significant if problematic role of biofuels, and the tantalising potential of gas hydrates and cooking oil from kerogen shales.
How do we reconcile this abundance of resources with fears of declining production? The result is the appeal to „the end of easy oil?. The argument goes that new petroleum supplies, though available, are more difficult and costly than before, requiring new technology, located in remote or unstable regions, or environmentally damaging. Hence at best, prices will continue to rise; at worst, some of these resources may be permanently inaccessible.
Yet the idea of easy oil ignores history, and the advance of technology.
There has never been an age of easy oil. Drillers in Persia in the early 1900s had to contend with smallpox, hostile tribes, corrosive water and misleading surface geology. North Sea roughnecks of the 1970s faced mountainous seas, blowouts and massive cost over-runs. Technology advances in line with our needs. Drilling in two kilometres of water was unthinkable in the 1990s; now, it is almost routine.
Much of the run-up in industry costs this century is the result of inadequate investment in the previous decade, and a consequent shortage of engineers, geologists, rigs and steel. In the early 2000s, oil sands developments were thought to require an oil price around $30 per barrel; now $80 is often quoted. Yet the geology has not changed, while technology has advanced significantly. Given time, these bottlenecks can be remedied.
Oil extraction costs are a constant battle between increasing depletion and advancing technology. Once we crack the secret of developing a large resource, such as shale gas or extra-heavy oil, costs fall over time as we gain experience.
Yes, many unconventional plays have higher development costs and require special approaches, but they have no exploration risk, and are typically located onshore in stable countries. As some of the US gas shales are cheaper than traditional North American plays, unconventional resources are becoming conventional.
Talking about the „end of easy oil? is an admission that we have failed as an industry. It gives entirely the wrong message. It tells countries lucky enough still to have some „easy oil? that there is no point opening up to international investment, and no risk of competition if they don?t.
It tells bright young people at university that petroleum is a sunset business and they should look elsewhere for a career. And it tells the general public that energy prices are only going to rise, and that society should make costly efforts to develop alternatives to oil and gas. These are dangerous trends, at a time that many people are already hostile to the petroleum industry on environmental grounds.
Instead, the message should be that we are developing the technology and business models to turn difficult petroleum into easy and environmentally acceptable energy. That is how international oil companies can keep themselves useful and relevant to the leading oil nations, and to the globe?s energy consumers.
By Robin Mills
Robin M. Mills is a Dubai-based energy economist, and author of ‘The Myth of the Oil Crisis’. You can contact Robin directly at: robin@oilcrisismyth.com. The Myth of the Oil Crisis’ explores myths surrounding the global consumption of oil.With oil prices rising, drivers wince whenever they pull into the petrol station and businesses watch their bottom lines shrink. Predictions suggest that the situation will only get worse as oil dries up. It's a plausible argument, especially considering the rate at which countries like China and India are now using oil. Even more worrisome, the world's largest oil fields sit in unstable, geopolitical hotspots like Iran and Iraq. More information on his book can be found at: www.oilcrisismyth.com
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9 comments
Oh and look, also yesterday we had this.
"China Passes U.S. as World's Biggest Energy Consumer, IEA Says"
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFZAGDS5vQ9Y
OK so it's mostly coal rather than oil, but overall the per-capital energy consumption level is still only 20% of that of the US.
Is it going to be possible to increase per-capita Chinese energy consumption by 400% over the next decades? If that was all oil it would mean the entirety of global output going to one country.
Yup, pump prices in the US aren't high enough - yet. ;0)
That's something Washington will struggle with, as high gas prices are a sure route to political oblivion.
I like this ...
"Big Is Back For American Auto Buyers" - http://www.cnbc.com/id/38328050
Basically, SUV sales are rising again. That would be the famous demand destruction in action then.
Above I said that "Peak Oil is a problem of time and money". Well I think I would like to revise this to "Peak Oil is a problem of human stupidity". Or perhaps "stupidly high discount rates" would be a more charitable phrase than "stupidity".
This poster showing the "peak oil" supply curve is worth checking out: http://www.oilposter.org/posterlarge.html (found while Googling here - http://evilutionarybiologist.blogspot.com/2008/10/book-review-myth-of-oil-crisis.html).
One way I like to look at this issue:
How long would it take to ramp up the oil sands (or CTL) to, say, 75m bpd? How much would it cost?
The answers are a) many decades and b) $trillions.
It would also require a consistent oil price around $100.
Peak Oil is about time and money, not oil in the ground, and we don't have enough of either.
This article is fundamentally flawed & inconsistent. the author claims that the "end of easy oil" is a myth but let's have a look at all the supposed "saviours" of oil depletion:
Are any of these apparently massive resources "easy"? No. As the author points out, they either need technology that doesn't currently exist to exploit them or, more significantly, require substantially larger resources to exploit them than traditional "easy" sources. For all of these, a much greater input of raw materials is required than was the case for easy-to-exploit on-shore resources. Ergo, to exploit them economically, the price achieved MUST be higher than it used to be. There is considerable industry doubt about the sustainability of the shale resources, which deplete much more rapidly than conventional resources and cause concern about environmental impact from the higher density of wells required and the large amount of fraccing necessary.
The author is correct that this doesn't make the oil industry an unattractive one to enter because oil & gas remain important resources, for theforeseeable future, and creative thinking is required to access these harder-to-exploit resources. However, higher prices are necessary to be able to exploit those resources economically.
Mark
Hi Mark and Mattybuoy, thanks very much for the thoughtful comments. A couple of further thoughts in reply:
(a) Firstly, I pointed to significant remaining resources of 'easy' oil in Iran, Iraq, etc. Secondly, you seem to be assuming a fixed set of technology. My central point in the article is that technology advances to meet more challenging resources. It is therefore not necessarily true that prices have to rise indefinitely. Extracting oil sands today is less technologically challenging for us than drilling for shallow oil in Pennsylvania was for drillers in the 1860s. New fields in the 1980s and 1990s (Alaska, North Sea) were more challenging than those of the 1960s and 1970s, but extraction costs were lower because technology made these fields accessible. Petrobras is confident that the pre-salt oil fields will be economic at oil prices of $35-40/bbl.
(b) There is no need to ramp up CTL or oil sands to 75 million bbl/day. As I said in the article, we still have very substantial remaining resources of conventional oil. Unconventionals at the moment have only to grow slowly, and oil sands are not the only source of unconventional oil. In my book, I have addressed the issue of time, and concluded that, even with a slow decline in conventional production, unconventional oil can grow fast enough largely to meet demand - and this is ignoring the continuing demand responses to high oil prices such as more efficient/alternative fuel vehicles, switching away from oil in power and industry, etc.
Robin
I'm a bit puzzled here. I have no quibble with the idea that technological developments can generally lower production costs, raise recovery rates and improve field economics. But I don't think that is the central issue!
The central issue seems to me to be the rate of production. And, whilst the pre-salt fields off Brazil undeniably hold substantial resources and reserves for the future, there are nevertheless limits on the ability of the industry in respect of the rates of production from these reservoirs. I don't see much evidence that the laws of geology that govern optimal production rates are being changed by technology!
With respect to the Brazilian fields, it would seem that in aggregate they could produce 1-2mn bopd....perhaps a bit more in a few years time - but 1-2mn bopd seems to be the current expectation from authoratative sources. This makes them one of the most important sources of global supply growth - but the flipside is that there is the continual (and rapid, in the cases of producers such as Mexico and the UK) problem of depletion.
I am completely unpersuaded that global production capacity is capable of much growth, given the background of depletion (including future depletion risks from major Saudi fields such as Ghawar)....and indeed falls remain likely in the medium term. What technological improvements are doing is enabling us to run very fast but, thanks to the treadmill of depletion working against us, we are barely standing still in terms of the ability of global supply to keep up with global demand!
ee
Hi Robin,
I certainly wouldn't claim that "prices have to rise indefinitely". However, it does seem unlikely that prices will return to 1990s levels. We're a long way from being able to add marginal barrels at those sort of prices.
I am sceptical of a claim by Petrobras that the Santos basin fields will be economic at $35-$40/bbl (it is in their interests to underplay the difficulty & expense of exploiting those fields). Huge investment is required and unprecendented technical challenges have to be met. If Petrobras acts responsibly (which I expect it will), it will also have to take on board the lessons of the GoM spill, which are likely to mean additional costs to ensure that deepwater drilling is safe.
As for conventional production declining slowly... well, I guess that may depend on what is REALLY happening at Ghawar. Mexican, Venezualan & North Sea production did not exactly decline slowly.
"Easy oil", by definition, does NOT require those large inputs. Under that definition, North Sea oil wasn't "easy" (and you point out the challenges that had to be overcome) - and production declined very rapidly once investors were deterred, due to low prices. That is still having its effect today, with larger companies being reluctant to invest there, due to cost. Hence you have not proven the claim that the "end of easy oil" is a myth.
Iran and Iraq are the only possible major sources that can be exploited at low costs to compensate for reducing supplies elsewhere. Should we place our faith in those countries alone to meet our future needs? IMO all the other sources you mention require prices at or above current levels to support adequate investment. That is my main point and the counter to your argument: there is no foreseeable technology to exploit the other sources you mention that does not require large inputs of raw materials & effort. By arguing otherwise you deter the necessary investment, increasing the risk of supply squeezes & price spikes (if anyone influential believes you).
Mark