Daily Stock Market Report (Thur 11th June 2026) - RWS, HLMA, PAY, SRB, WIZZ, NXR, CNC

SpaceX is reported to be massively oversubscribed, with more than four times the demand than the quantity of shares that are actually available.

Official pricing is today (at the fixed price of $135 per share) and trading in the shares should begin tomorrow.

At a $1.8 trillion valuation, it will be more valuable than Tesla (NSQ:TSLA) and Meta Platforms (NSQ:META) but not quite as valuable as the likes of Amazon.com (NSQ:AMZN) and Microsoft (NSQ:MSFT). It will be a top 10 stock in the US by market cap.

In terms of its historical importance, it’s a truly landmark event. Alibaba Holding (NYQ:BABA) had a market cap of $169 billion at its IPO price, which seemed enormous at the time (this was in 2014). Saudi Aramco was valued at $1.7 trillion at its 2019 IPO, although they only raised $29 billion.

SpaceX, by contrast, is raising $75 billion - and apparently could have raised a lot more.

If you want my opinion, we have moved into a stage of the long-term bull market where prices for popular shares are now entirely unmoored from the fundamentals. I’ve mentioned recently the price to sales multiples for SpaceX, which do not fit with any standard method of valuation. But maybe this time is different?

Overnight market movements:

• The FTSE is set to open down 0.3% at 10,220

• S&P 500 is up 0.4% at 7,300

• Brent crude is up 0.4% at $93.30

• Gold is up 0.6% at $4,100

• Bitcoin is up 1.5% at $62,700

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Leaving it there for now, cheers!

Spreadsheet accompanying this report: link.

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Companies Reporting

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Graham's Section

Halma (LON:HLMA)

Down 15% at £39.38 (£14.97bn) - Full Year Results - Graham - AMBER ↓

These 2026 results look good against expectations, but it’s the FY27 outlook that is more questionable.

Firstly, a brief overview of FY March 2026. (By the way, I find it easiest to read them on Halma’s website as the RNS itself is empty.)

• Revenue +15% to £2,582m (StockReport forecast: £2,559m)

• Organic revenue growth of 16%, far above their long-term target of 7% thanks to high growth in their photonics business.

• Adjusted EPS +21% to 114.05p (StockReport forecast: £113p)

Halma’s US-based photonics business designs, develops and manufactures photonics equipment out of Philadelphia.

The results are clean with statutory EPS of 98.57p (up 26%).

The company calculates an “adjusted Return on Total Invested Capital” of 16.2%, up from 15% last year, which is also very encouraging.

The full-year dividend gets a 7% increase to 24.74p, which is covered several times over by EPS.

Leverage is modest at 1.16x, “well within operating range of up to two times”.

So what’s the catch?

Outlook:

We have made a positive start to the 2027 financial year, with a strong order book and order intake ahead of revenue and last year.

But…?

While the economic and geopolitical environment remains uncertain and our companies continue to experience varied conditions in their end markets, we currently expect to deliver low double-digit percentage organic constant currency revenue growth in this financial year, including premium growth of approximately five percentage points from our photonics business.

Adjusted EBIT margin is expected to be in line with the 2026 financial year (excluding the one-off from the Nuvonic transaction).

Graham’s view

Checking forecasts, I can see a £2.87 billion revenue forecast on the StockReport for 2027.

Granted that this number is not organic, but that’s an increase of 11% over the 2026 figure.

This seems to match well with the outlook provided today of “low double-digit percentage organic” growth.

Indeed, low double-digit organic growth, plus some inorganic growth from the 2025 acquisitions, perhaps could help to boost FY27 revenue over that £2.87 billion forecast?

None of this seems to justify a 15% fall in the share price.

I’ve also checked the forecast EBIT margins and can’t detect any major disappointment in the outlook on that front, either. The market already expected FY27 margins to match FY26 margins.

But I think I can put together some post hoc reasons for today’s fall in the share price.

1. FY27 EPS forecasts have been on a rising trend, and the market may have expected a continuation of that trend, with scope for another upgrade. Today’s outlook doesn’t provide that.

2. Instead, today’s outlook raises the spectre of a potential profit warning with talk of "uncertainty" and "varied conditions" in end markets.

3. Halma’s share price has been on a terrific run in 2026, up over 30% year-to-date. As I’ve stated several times recently, “selling the news” is a common tactic on the day of results or trading updates, after a run like this.

4. The P/E multiple going into these results of 36x is at a level that tends to be especially fragile to any negative change or uncertainty around the outlook. The ValueRank here is only 5.

I believe that the new forward P/E multiple is about 31x, after today’s fall.

With photonics growth expected to recede, the total organic growth rate will shrink from 15% to maybe c. 11%, and the long-term target growth rate is only 7%. Personally, I expect higher growth rates than this, from a business trading at this sort of earnings multiple.

In December, I said that I wanted to find “any excuse” to downgrade our stance on Halma from AMBER/GREEN to neutral. The market cap today is higher now than it was in December, and I think I now have enough reasons to justify a neutral stance on this High Flyer. So I’m AMBER on this today.

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Norcros (LON:NXR)

Up 3% at 270p (£243m) - Results for the 53 weeks ended 5 April 2026 - Graham - AMBER/GREEN =

I was praising Norcros last summer for simplifying its operations, at 268p.

Fast forward to 2026 and the share price has barely moved since then, although the company has continued to evolve.

It has closed its tile manufacturing operations in South Africa (Johnson Tiles South Africa), having already sold Johnson Tiles UK.

It also recently announced that it was exploring the sale of the remainder of its South African businesses.

But on the other hand, it bought a Norwegian supplier of wall panels for £45m.

All of these changes “reflect the Group's continuing focus on both simplifying the portfolio and increasing exposure to more resilient mid-premium product segments and geographies” (according to the update last month).

Turning to today’s results:

• Revenue +10.6% includes the Norwegian acquisition of Fibo.

• Organic growth of 0.7% is much more modest but is described as being “ahead of the market”.

• Underlying operating profit +7.9% to £48m

Actual operating profit is only £22m, less than half of the massaged number that includes £26m of adjustments.

These adjustments include:

• £13m of “acquisition and disposal related costs”. Amortisation is included here (nearly £8m).

• £3m IAS19 administrative costs, which are to do with administering the pension scheme.

• £10m of exceptional items, the largest of which is £7m of impairment but there are another £3m of miscellaneous costs lumped in here.

I’m willing to look past the acquisition and disposal related costs, and the impairment, but I’m not inclined to look past the other items.

However, after checking the pension scheme notes, I find that there’s an agreement to reduce NXR’s contributions to its running costs to max £1m.

So in this case, I’m willing to agree with the company’s interpretation and to look past the vast majority of the items they highlighted. I therefore estimate the real profit figure as about £45m (close to their £48m figure).

That’s a measure of operating profit, stated before the impact of net financial debt (£66m) and leases (£31m).

Outlook

Group revenue in the two months to the end of May 2026 was 3.1% ahead of the prior year on a constant currency like for like basis, adjusting for Johnson Tiles SA and the acquisition of Fibo. Market conditions are likely to remain subdued, with the pace of any recovery in the new build sector still unclear. The mid-premium RMI sector currently remains more resilient and the Board's expectations for FY27 are unchanged.

Graham’s view

The lack of organic growth is pretty unsettling. Combine that with the very competitive markets in which Norcros operates - bathroom and kitchen products - and we are left to conclude that this should trade on a very cheap valuation.

That’s what the market is giving us:

If I attempt to value it on an EV/EBIT basis, I have:

• Market cap = £243m

• Debts (including leases in our calculation, since EBIT excludes some lease costs these days) = £97m

• Enterprise value = £340m

EBIT (operating profit) we estimated above at around £45m.

That gives an EV/EBIT multiple of 7.5x, only a little higher than Stockopedia’s estimate of the P/E multiple.

So I think Norcros shares do still offer value, but for good reasons.

At least the story has improved in recent years. We used to bang on in this report about its pension scheme and its South African exposure. The pension deficit is not really an issue now (it was £12m as of March 2024, and the company has been making annual contributions of nearly £4m). And they are leaving South Africa.

So I think it’s fair to be more optimistic about Norcros than we have been historically. We have been AMBER/GREEN since last year and I believe that remains the correct call today.

1-year chart:

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Mark's Section

RWS Holdings (LON:RWS)

Down 13% at 88p (£381m) - Half-year Financial Report - Mark - AMBER/GREEN ↓

I have to admit to selling out of this still apparently cheap stock on the news that they were paying between £16.5 and £40m for a business that was founded two years ago which turned over £2.5m and lost £1.5m last year. Paying between 6.6 and 16x sales for a start up, just smacked of a certain desperation from management and I started to worry that this was not the behaviour of a company where everything was going well with its core business. In light of that, these figures don’t look to bad (at least on an adjusted basis):

Although they appear to have forgotten how to calculate a percentage when it comes to their declining dividend payout!

Adjustments:

These figures are not a surprise, though, as they already announced £360m revenue and £24m PBT in their HY trading update. How they got there is what is revealed in these results. Here is their description of those adjustments:

• Group Transformation Programme - £3.3m - including costs related to transitioning our current on-premises infrastructure to a modern cloud-based environment

• Strategic project costs - £0.3m - costs involved in corporate development opportunities.

• Restructuring and integration costs - £7.5m - related to severance and termination payments related to the Group's cost reduction plans, and other corporate restructuring initiatives.

These categories aren’t necessarily out of place for many companies’ reporting these days. However, these are mostly cash costs and explain why the cash conversion has dropped from 92% last half year to 67% in this half. The IT costs really should be part of the normal investment a company makes into running their business in my opinion. And I have a natural revulsion towards companies that want us to give them the benefit of cost-cutting but ignore all the costs of doing so. After all, they booked £4.6m of restructuring costs in H1 last year, and £14.2m in H2. These costs are looking less and less exceptional.

In light of all this, it is hard to believe that the adjusted figures represent the economic reality of the business, at least until it is clear that they are through the current restructuring phase of the business.

Segmental Reporting

The company recently changed their reporting segments. As a reminder here is how the old structure maps into the new one:

Generate:

This is the stand out performer in this half, although a declining profit margin takes the edge off:

They say this was due to “Exceptional revenue performance driven by TrainAI from programmes with existing clients and initial revenues from a new global technology client.”

Strangely, TrainAI seems to be lower margin than the rest of this segment, and they say that in H2 “TrainAI exceptional H1 revenue will continue to dilute margins.” I’m not sure why providing a lot of training data to LLMs isn't a very high margin business.

Transform

The revenue decline was in line with their previous guidance. This segment contains their own AI translation tool: Language Weaver Pro. This shows what we can expect, clients will pay less for AI translation, but the costs are lower too, driving higher profits on lower revenue.

Protect:

This is the most worrying part with the margin decline said to be due to product mix and an increase in overhead cost. This is where the Obviously acquisition sits and shows signs that one of the key contributors to historical profits is under pressure.

Strategy:

I continue to be worried about trainAI. This may be responsible for a return to revenue growth for the business as a whole. However, management have yet to give a convincing argument to me as to why they aren’t just giving away the crown jewels (a huge database of accurately translated technical documents) to competitors in return for a short-term payment.

Adding the pressure in Protect that appears to have led them to buy a loss-making start up on a high multiple of revenue, this shows that they may face technological competitive pressure throughout the business.

Outlook:

The outlook is said to be in line:

Expect mid-single-digit revenue growth on an OCC³ basis, improving profitability, and continued strong free cash flow conversion for the full year as we benefit from recent client wins, growth in Generate and Protect and our efficiency programme.

Mid-single digits aligns with the 5% revenue growth in H1, and would actually be above analysts consensus, but I would imagine the organic constant currency bit is doing the damage.

On profitability they add the line:

Current FX rates, after hedging, are expected to have a c.£2m adverse impact on full year PBT, alongside the anticipated £1m in-year impact from the Obviously acquisition which is expected to start contributing during FY27.

It is not wholly clear whether they consider themselves to be trading in line with expectations despite these factors. However, given the scale of the adjustments in these half year results, I wouldn’t be surprised if they are trading in line without these headwinds, i.e. slightly below.

Sadly, mere mortals such as us don’t have access to broker research, so it is hard to say if today’s share price drop is due to cuts to broker numbers, or if shareholders simply didn’t like the narrative.

Dividends:

Having failed to calculate a percentage for us, we fear the worst on the dividend payout. However, the cut to the interim dividend at 29% is less than the cut to the final dividend, which was down 56%:

To hit the FY forecast payout the company would need to raise the final dividend to 5.35p, which may be a stretch considering net debt has risen from £25.4m to £32.5m year on year. Post period end, they have spent £16.5m on the Obviously acquisition.

The leverage ratio remains modest at less than 1x EBITDA. However, we are used to this business running with net cash, plus they have cut the dividend and not bought back shares despite the share price dropping to a third of the price they last acquired stock in the market. This suggests that they are comfortable with the current debt levels, but not particularly keen to take on more, given the big shifts happening in their core business.

Mark’s view

On the surface, these are reasonable in line results. However, the more I look into them, the less I like them. Hitting the H1 trading figures required continued significant adjustments for IT projects and redundancy payouts. It seems that hitting full year guidance will need a similarly heroic performance from the accounts department. They are already flagging FX headwinds and the loss from their recently acquired business. The cynic in me thinks they will shortly be asking us to exclude these too.

Then there are the issues of strategy: does it really make sense to be taking (what appears to be low-margin) revenue to train competitors’ LLMs on your proprietary data? Are declining margins in Protect flagging serious competitive pressures?

However, the fact that the strategy here is open to debate, and the company loves its adjustments are not new information. Which makes today’s double-digit fall a bit of a mystery. I can only think that the market may have gotten a little ahead of itself. After all, the strongest Rank here prior to these results was the Momentum one:

Part of the recent rise appears to be due to the market liking the Obviously acquisition. However, to me paying between 6.6x and 16x sales for a loss-making startup was a sign of desperation rather than strategic brilliance.

Roland upgraded this to GREEN following last year’s final results when the share price was around 80p, citing the recovering fundamentals and mid-single-digit forward P/E. The shares briefly touched 110p, but with them now back below 90p, many of the positive arguments still stand.

However, I think there are also some reasons for caution. That single-digit P/E is based on heavily adjusted figures, and the company already seems to be flagging some extra adjustments required to make current trading in-line with expectations. The dividend also looks like it may come in a little below analysts’ consensus for the full year. With these in mind I think we should take a slightly more cautious view of AMBER/GREEN, at least until the gap between adjusted and statutory figures is narrower and the strategy concerns are shown to be overblown.

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PayPoint (LON:PAY)

Up 4% at 580p (£335m) - Final Results - Mark - GREEN =

First up, Paypoint are in my bad books for giving their RNS a promotional title (“Record profits delivered and reorganisation to deliver next stage of growth”) rather than what they are actually releasing (Results for the year ended 31 March 2026). When we look back through the myriad of news flow, it’s easy to miss what these are (although at least they got the classification right):

This already makes me wary and suspect they are doing this for Partridge reasons (“Lynn, to the untrained eye this could look rubbish and that I haven’t bounced back.”) Here are the actual figures:

These are indeed record figures, but it is worth bearing in mind that net revenue, u/l EBITDA, and u/l PBT all grew less than the rate of UK inflation which grew by 3.3% in the reporting period.

Adj. EPS comes in at 73.6p, which looks below the 77.2p consensus in Stockopedia. However, it is hard to be certain that this is a miss given our lack of access to broker notes. The consensus appears to have not shifted despite a broadly in line, i.e. slightly below statement in March. What is clear is that this is significantly below the 97p consensus prior to the profits warning in November last year an the market appears to have been right in repricing the stock.

Adjustments:

The good news is that the gap between adjusted and statutory figures has narrowed considerably. Here is the breakdown:

It is normal to exclude amortisation. I wonder if Aperidata is the source of the investment loss, as in the breakdown of Exceptional Items they take a receivable impairment:

Saying:

The current period cost relates to a balance due to PayPoint Plc from Aperidata Limited, which the Company does not expect to recover. The Company also holds investments in Aperidata, which it has written down to £nil at 31 March 2026

Aperidata doesn’t appear to be insolvent as far as I can see, so presumably PayPoint have written down this receivable but chosen not to try to enforce the debt. At least these write downs appear to be one-off.

What has appeared in the adjustments is a restructuring cost. Again this is a company that wants all the benefits and shareholders to ignore the costs. At least in this case, the number is relatively small compared to the overall PBT. Overall, these are cleaner numbers than in the recent past.

Segmental reporting:

The company has recently changed their reporting segments, but also reports today in the old format. The stand out one is:

E-commerce divisional net revenue decreased by 4.9% to £15.6 million (FY25: £16.4 million)

• Collect+ parcel transactions grew by 1.5% to 135.4 million (FY25: 133.4 million), with continued strong momentum from Royal Mail balanced by the impact of the InPost/Yodel commercial reset early in the year

• Consolidation of Collect+ network at 14,076 sites (31 March 2025: 14,213) with a focus on service compliance and consumer satisfaction

This looks like one of the previous growth engines Collect+ is operating in a now saturated or low-growth market. The good news is that they appeared to have timed this very well, paying £6m in 2020 to Yodel for Collect+ and getting £43.9m for the 49% they sold to IDS (Royal Mail) last year.

In the new divisional structure, Digital Payments and Open Banking, is the best performing part:

The Digital Payments and Open Banking business provides payment processing, Open Banking connectivity, and AI-driven credit analytics, helping organisations manage transactions, verify customers, and assess lending risk.

This is actually quite an exciting area as Paypoint are part of the UK initiative to cut out Visa & Mastercard from transactions. They say:

In Open Banking, we have made further progress in executing our strategy and leveraging our extensive capabilities. In PayPoint, we are focused on winning business with both new and existing clients delivering Open Banking services and payments channels, all enabled by obconnect and Aperidata, with 26 new client services live in the year, including the Department for Work and Pensions, AccessPay, Gousto and the Insolvency Service for Confirmation of Payee. A recently announced partnership with Raidiam and the Retail Energy Code Company (RECCo) will see the business providing a consent framework for the UK energy industry to securely share smart meter data controlled by the consent of end-customers. In addition, as a founding member of the UK Payments Initiative, PayPoint is closely involved in the rollout of account‑to‑account (A2A) payments in the UK, including exploring how these services can be made available in‑store to support inclusive access for all customers.

It seems a bit strange they namecheck Aperidata seeing as they appear to have been unable to pay money they owe Paypoint. However, the potential here is still large.

Cash flow:

For many investors in Paypoint the big attraction is their history of increasing quarterly dividends. Even without the special dividend that followed the sale of half of Collect+, The yield is impressive at over 7%. A 20p final dividend is declared in two quarterly payments of 10p each over the next few months, which is up 2% versus the previous year.

The combination of the normal dividend and £30m share buyback over the last year has been about half debt-funded, with net debt rising by about £35m:

Capex has increased, but there were also one off payments to acquire part of a business, and one of the legal settlements. At least these should be one-off and improve the cash flow going forward. They still have an ongoing buyback:

A continuation of the £30m share buyback over FY27 and FY28 means the business remains on track to deliver a further 10m reduction in shares, representing an overall reduction of shares in issue of c.30% since the commencement of the buyback programme.

This certainly aids EPS. However, it seems likely that there will be a further small increase in net debt to be able to fund the ongoing dividend and buyback. The leverage ratio at 1.45 doesn’t look out of place for this sort of business, possibly placing them at the upper limit of their 1.2-1.5x target.

Outlook:

Although growth for FY26 was pretty lacklustre, the good news is that revenue growth is likely to improve going forward:

FY27 is a year of evolution for the business with the reorganisation now underway driving significant change throughout the Group and strengthening the platform required to deliver a net revenue target growth rate of 5-8% per annum.

They say they expect all four divisions to grow revenue this year. However, it sounds like there may be some more exceptional costs on the way:

Our priorities in the first quarter have been to: implement the announced organisational changes; ensure minimal disruption to the trading momentum in the business; and establish a strong foundation to trading early in the year. Early indications are that we have had a positive start to the year with resilient underlying trading and some encouraging new business wins.

And a H2 weighting is never well received by shareholders:

In terms of profit balance for the current year, we expect a greater weighting towards the second half, reflecting both an accelerating contribution from new business and the positive impact of several of our seasonal businesses.

Given the company warned in March and these results represent that

However, if they are right about being confident of hitting market forecasts, they are on a very modest P/E of around 7, which seems low even adjusting for around a third of the market cap in net corporate debt.

Mark’s view

Graham controversially upgraded this following the second (although this time minor) profits warning in March this year, citing the continued modest rating and high yield. There is also an ongoing share buyback, which suggests that the company continues to view their shares as too cheap compared to the future prospects, a sentiment I agree with, given the return to growth of all four divisions and the potential in Open Banking/Payments.

However, the recent shareholder returns have been at least particularly debt funded and with a H2-weighting guidance, that debt level is likely to rise in the short term, increasing the risk. They also have form for missing expectations recently, and a lack of broker forecasts visible to us, means it is hard to judge if those will be moderated going forward.

Despite these concerns, the valuation wins out, in my opinion and I don't see anything in these results that should change our favourable view. GREEN

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Wizz Air Holdings (LON:WIZZ)

Up 6% at 1031p (£1.0bn) - Final Results - Mark - AMBER/RED

When I previewed this in The Week Ahead, I highlighted how Ryanair CEO Michael O'Leary publicly claimed that Wizz Air could face bankruptcy by late 2026 due to soaring global jet fuel prices, and the companies push back against that statement.

These results highlight that the company had been expanding prior to these cost winds. Possibly putting themselves in a uniquely challenging situation:

It stands out that a 16% increase in EBITDA leads to mere break-even at a statutory profit level:

These are the things I said to look out for in these results:

Middle East Profit Hit: The Middle East historically accounts for about 8% of Wizz Air's capacity, so watch how effectively they have redeployed these routes, and whether Summer booking resilience has helped soften the blow.

This is what they say:

Most of this capacity was immediately redeployed to our core CEE markets, improving the existing summer season products to destinations in Spain, Italy, Croatia, Albania and others. We continue to monitor closely the situation on the ground in the Middle East and in Ukraine. On 28 of May we resumed flights to Tel Aviv from most of our CEE bases.

GTF Engine Grounding: The exact number of aircraft out of service and the timeline for their return. Details of any compensation from Pratt & Whitney or insurers.

This is what they say:

As of 31 March 2026, Wizz Air had 30 aircraft grounded due to GTF engine-related inspections; showing an improvement compared with the end of F25 when the grounded fleet comprised 42 aircraft. GTF engine-related groundings expected at the end of F27 are in the range of 15-20 aircraft with this figure reducing to 0 by the end of calendar year 2027.

They say they “continued to receive OEM compensation from Pratt & Whitney related to the GTF engine issues” but the amount doesn’t appear to be specified.

Fuel Hedging for FY2027: The company may be largely protected for FY26, but what about future years? How does this impact forward guidance?

They look to be reasonably well covered for FY27. However, a lack of coverage for FY28 stands out:

Presumably, this gives them enough time to reflect fuel prices in ticket prices for that period, so may not be an issue.

Forward guidance:

In perhaps a worrying sign, they refuse to give any forward guidance. It is clear that capacity is growing given the fleet growth, and they say that load factor is expected to be flat, which means around 90%. This seems reasonable but we don’t know the pricing they have used to get there.

Balance sheet:

Net debt is significant, but is flat, which actually seems impressive given the fleet growth:

Net cash up significantly gives them a lot of liquidity. However, like all airlines, the model of selling a customer a ticket before the flight tends to lead to significantly negative working capital.

Valuation:

Given the lack of guidance it is hard to consider valuation. Brokers clearly think current events will lead to an EPS loss:

This is a cyclical industry and the company has generated significant profits in the past. However, I have no idea when it may do so again. There isn't an obvious asset play as it trades on a premium to Book Value. I therefore put this in the “too hard” category.

Mark’s view

There doesn’t appear to be signs of the immediate solvency concerns raised by competitors, which is perhaps why the market liked these results. However, with no forward guidance and brokers forecasting EPS losses for the foreseeable future, I struggle to make the investment case here, versus something like Jet2, which is forecast to be profitable and on a lower P/TBV rating. So I feel I need to go AMBER/RED overall.