Daily Stock Market Report (Tue 9th June 2026) - BWY, GLE, FEVR, SSIT, TIME, COST, LBG

OpenAI has filed its initial registration statement (the S-1 form) with the SEC. On their blog, they wrote:

We expect it to leak so we’re just announcing it. We have not decided on timing yet; it may be a while because there are things we want to do that are likely easier as a private company.

This catches up OpenAI with its rival Anthropic, which also recently filed its S-1.

Meanwhile, the SpaceX IPO is happening on Friday:

• Ticker code SPCX.

• IPO price: $135 per share

• Market cap: $1.77 trillion (the biggest IPO ever)

At this market cap, the valuation of SpaceX is over 90 times last year’s revenues, although that is measured prior to the acquisition by SpaceX of xAI. Based on 2026 forecasts, the price to sales multiple is a more modest 70x.

As an aside, I note that the FTSE finished flat yesterday, compared to Friday’s close, entirely unaffected by the weakness in AI shares. It’s up slightly over the past week, while the S&P 500 is down 2.5% and the NASDAQ is down 4%.

Overnight market movements:

• The FTSE is set to open unchanged at 10,370

• S&P 500 is up 0.3% at 7,430

• Brent crude is down 1% at $93.20

• Gold is up .4% at $4,350

• Bitcoin is unchanged at $63,400

Finishing there, thank you. Spreadsheet accompanying this report: link.

Companies Reporting

Graham's Section

Seraphim Space Investment Trust (LON:SSIT)

Up 14% at 212.5p (£664m) - ICEYE Financing Round - Graham - AMBER =

We haven’t covered this much but I understand that it's a popular and interesting story, often featuring in our list of “Most Viewed” stocks.

I initially took a look at it in April at a share price of 180p.

It has been as high as 270p, before dropping back:

Today’s update relates to a satellite company originally from Finland, ICEYE, in which both Seraphim Space Investment Trust (LON:SSIT) and Molten Ventures (LON:GROW) are invested.

A description of ICEYE, from its own website:

ICEYE owns the world's largest and most advanced SAR (synthetic aperture radar) satellite constellation. We deliver persistent monitoring capabilities to detect and respond to changes in any location on Earth.

Key points:

• ICEYE is privately raising €450m at a valuation of over €10 billion

• At March 2026, ICEYE was 47.1% of SSIT’s NAV.

• The new valuation would increase SSIT’s NAV by 73p

The Chief Investment Officer at SSIT’s manager says:

"For SSIT shareholders, this financing round demonstrates the Company's ability to provide access to category-leading SpaceTech companies at the forefront of some of the most important technological and geopolitical trends shaping the global economy."

Graham’s view

Before checking SSIT as a whole, I’d like to briefly look at some of ICEYE’s financials.

It posted its 2025 results as follows:

• Revenue >€250m

• EBITDA >€100m

• Cash >€350m

• Cash from operations >€130m

• Contracted backlog €1.5 billion

They launched six new satellites, bringing their total number of launched satellites to 70.

They said that ICEYE “doubled in 2025 and is set to grow at a similar rate in 2026”.

Now let’s suppose that ICEYE’s revenue reaches €500m this year.

At a €10 billion valuation, that’s a price to sales multiplier of 20x. Great value compared to SpaceX, at least!

All references to EBITDA and cash from operations are irrelevant as the tooth fairy doesn’t pay for capex, not even in space.

To my eyes, therefore, I would have to say that the €10 billion valuation of ICEYE is highly speculative. At a forward price/sales multiple of 20x, there is no other conclusion I can draw.

Seraphim Space Investment Trust (LON:SSIT)

Turning away from ICEYE to look at SSIT, this is now a FTSE-250 component.

Q3 results were published last week with the following info:

• NAV £421m as of March 2026

• NAV per share 177.6p, up 24.8% quarter-on-quarter

• Shares in issue 237m

This was a tremendous quarterly gain, “largely due to continued strong performance of ICEYE, funding rounds at Xona Space Systems and Tomorrow.io and the HawkEye 360 indicative IPO pricing…”

Their portfolio was made up as follows:

• ICEYE 47.1%

• ALL SPACE 13.6%

• HawkEye 360 9.8% (Stockreport: HawkEye 360 (NYQ:HAWK))

• Xona Space Systems 6.7%

…and various smaller positions.

The 73p increase in NAV arising from ICEYE’s new valuation leads to a new NAV per share for SSIT of over 250p. SSIT has enjoyed a c. 41% increase in its total NAV from this single event.

These back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that SSIT is currently (at 212.5p) trading at a c. 15% discount to NAV.

But there are some good reasons for caution:

1. A highly concentrated portfolio with ICEYE being responsible for the vast majority of value means that NAV becomes less useful as a metric.

2. ICEYE’s valuation is itself open for debate and in my view should be controversial. Over what timeframe will it conceivably generate €10 billion of value for its investors, when its total revenue backlog is currently about one seventh of this?

3. SSIT itself is involved in heavy fundraising activity. 137m new C-shares have already been issued. While the dilutive effect of these shares is being mitigated in the short-term by keeping them distinct from SSIT’s ordinary shares, there could be complications arising from managing two separate pools of capital and attempting to merge them over time.

I’m going to stay neutral on SSIT. To be clear: I do not understand the value of ICEYE. And SSIT itself is now largely being driven by ICEYE’s valuation. But if I view SSIT purely as a vehicle with which to own space-related investments, and considering that the valuation of these investments is only going upwards for the time being, I can remain neutral.

If the space theme turns out to be a bubble (which I strongly suspect that it is), and it pops, I’ll want to have a negative stance on SSIT then. But for now, it seems that we are go for launch.

Roland's Section

MJ GLEESON (LON:GLE)

Down 4% at 238p (£139m) - Update on Gleeson Land - Roland - BLACK (AMBER =)

In February, I highlighted housebuilder Gleeson’s dependency on a big contribution from Land sales in H2 to meet profit expectations for the full year, which ends on 30 June 2026.

While lumpy contributions from the group’s Land business are the norm, this situation seemed more uncertain than usual, with a single site expected to account for 50% of all plot sales in FY26. The risk was that this – and other land sales – might slip into FY27, triggering a profit warning.

Today we have confirmation that this is what’s happened:

The majority of conditions required to achieve formal technical approval have been agreed, and the Group expects to conclude the remaining conditions soon. Completion of the transaction is now anticipated during the first half of the new financial year.Two additional, smaller land sales are also now expected to slip into FY27. This is said to be due to delayed decisions by major housebuilders, reflecting the current market environment.

Gleeson Homes: the good news is that trading at the group’s homebuilding business is in line with full-year expectations.

Revised outlook: the delayed land sales mean that MJ Gleeson’s adjusted pre-tax profit for the year is expected to be c.£7.5m below expectations.

Previous market expectations for pre-tax profit are given as being £16.4m to £18.5m, with a consensus of £17.8m.

That means this is a big miss – today’s revised guidance suggests pre-tax profit could be c.£10m, or around 40% below previous consensus.

Roland’s view

The market reaction to today’s profit warning has been muted, with the shares down by just 4% as I write, One reason for this may be that today’s warning was widely expected – the shares have already fallen by c.35% since February’s interim results:

Broker consensus has also continued to decline since February, most recently following the trading update on 1 May:

I don’t see any particular reason to doubt that the delayed land sales will complete in FY27, so this potentially helps to underpin forecasts for the year ahead.

Deep value? Gleeson’s valuation is already deeply discounted, with the shares trading at a discount of more than 50% to the group’s last-reported book value of 522p per share, or £305m.

The majority of this is accounted for by inventories of land and homes under construction which were valued at £417m at the end of 2025. Barring a housing market meltdown, I’d expect these assets to maintain most or all of their value when eventually sold.

One risk is that net debt will have risen further since the half-year mark, due to the delayed completion of these land sales. While H1 net debt of £22.5m looked comfortable against previous profit forecasts, leverage is relatively higher versus today’s revised guidance.

Another potential concern is that the twin pressures on housebuilders’ margins from a lack of pricing power and materials cost inflation will persist for some time, leaving them generating very low returns on equity and thus justifying discounted valuations.

However, on balance I think Gleeson shares are cheap enough to be of interest as a value or Contrarian investment – a view reflected in the StockRanks:

I note that Harwood Capital has become Gleeson’s largest shareholder, suggesting others see value here too:

As with Bellway above, the main risk I can see lies in the uncertain timing of any improvement in market conditions. I was neutral on Gleeson in February and don’t see any reason to change that view today. AMBER =

LBG Media (LON:LBG)

Down 24% at 27p (£56m) - Half-year Results - Roland - AMBER/GREEN ↑

LBG Media is “a social entertainment powerhouse with a focus on young adults” that’s home to a number of online publications and content marketing activities. Unfortunately the group’s core web properties aren’t as profitable as they used to be due to changes to Facebook advertising algorithms.

Today’s profit warning – the second in three months – and the shares have now fallen by nearly 70% so far this year:

Half-year results: key points

The combination of rising revenue and plummeting profits tells us that something is amiss here:

• Revenue up 19% to £52.4m

• Adjusted EBITDA down 34% to £8.0m

• Pre-tax profit down 79% to £1.8m

• Net cash down 14% to £28.4m

This situation is explained by the changing split between Direct and Indirect revenue:

• Direct revenue up 95% to £37.6m

• Indirect revenue down 41% to £14.5m

Direct revenue is generated from content marketing partnerships with brands – in essence, paid content and marketing efforts.

Indirect revenue is generated mainly from Facebook adverts placed alongside content on LBG websites, such as LADbible.

Indirect revenue is falling fast “due to previously announced changes to Meta’s Facebook algorithm in line with trends outlined in 2H25”, as well as lower search traffic due to AI Overviews (which discourage people from clicking through to search results).

Direct revenue is growing fast. But as broker Zeus highlights in an updated note today, there’s a problem:

Direct has mid-20% margins before central costs, while Indirect is >40%

In other words, Direct revenue is much less profitable than Indirect revenue, so the decline in Indirect has an outsized impact on profits.

Margins were also affected last year by “planned investment in our Direct markets”. This is evident in the breakdown of operating expenses, with content costs more than doubling relative to the same period last year.

I would hazard a guess that producing good quality content for brand partners is more expensive than the kind of lower quality (in my opinion) material published on the company’s own websites:

Trading commentary: LBG is naturally keen to talk up growth in the Direct business, especially in the US, where Direct revenue rose by 154% to £16.1m last year.

For contrast, Direct UK revenue rose by 64% to £20.6m.

If these growth rates can be maintained at stable margins then it certainly seems like the Direct business could help LBG to gradually eliminate its dependency on Indirect profits.

The US market is described as becoming “materially more important” and is clearly the big hope for growth. Management describes the US opportunity as “a multiplier for LBG Media”, potentially allowing the company to replicate its UK model at scale.

I note that LBG is willing to sacrifice margin in order to try and win market share in the US:

Within 1H26, two large client deals were offered at lower than usual margins in the U.S. business, to incentivise higher levels of spend and build the client relationships.

Time will tell whether LBG’s Direct content is sufficiently distinctive and commercial to provide it with the pricing power needed for this strategy to succeed.

As things stand, Direct performance metrics in the US remain lower than in the UK. This could suggest an opportunity – although I imagine competition is tough in the US market:

# clients generating campaign spend >$1m:

• UK: 16

• US: 7

Repeat client revenue:

• UK: 89%

• US: 62%

Revised outlook & Estimates

In April, LBG raised revenue guidance to £110m and cut adjusted EBITDA guidance to £22m.

Unfortunately today sees a cut to both revenue and EBITDA guidance due to the continuing weakness in the Indirect business:

While Direct continues to see a healthy pipeline and improving deal margins, the trends in Indirect have not stabilised as quickly as anticipated. As a result, the Board now expects FY26 revenue of £100m to £107m and Adjusted EBITDA in a range of £15m to £20m.

I think the risk is that Indirect revenue and profit could fall further, faster, before reaching a sustainable baseline.

Today’s revised forecasts from house broker Zeus tend to confirm this view, in my opinion, with cuts all the way out to FY28:

• FY26E adj EPS: 4.7p (-24% versus 6.2p previously)

• FY27E adj EPS: 5.9p (-18% versus 7.2p previously)

• FY28E adj EPS: 7.0p (-20% versus 8.7p previously)

In addition to higher costs, Zeus also expects revenue growth to be lower than previously expected – revenue forecasts have been cut by c.7% per year for FY26 through FY28.

Today’s cuts continue a downward trend for forecasts:

Questions over the sustainability of the company’s earnings may explain why LBG is trading on a FY26E P/E of 5x, falling to even lower levels for outer years.

Roland’s view

So far, I’ve focused on the performance of LBG’s operating business. My view is that the quality of earnings in the Indirect business is extremely low. The Direct business appears to be enjoying impressive revenue growth and could become a material business regardless of Indirect.

The concern I have regarding the Direct business is over its pricing power and sustainable level of margin. It operates in competitive markets with many competitors, some of whom are much larger.

Unfortunately, LBG doesn’t report the profit split between Indirect and Direct. This makes it hard for us to gauge the true value of the rapid revenue growth being seen in Direct.

However, there’s also another angle to this situation.

LBG Media’s market cap has fallen from £193m to £54m over the last year, but the group’s net cash position has remained relatively stable.

Today’s balance sheet shows net cash of £28.4m at the end of March, excluding leases (c.£14m) and contingent acquisition consideration (£8.6m). Even if we strip out the potential acquisition liability, that’s still c.£20m of net cash.

In other words, net cash now covers nearly half LBG’s market cap. This puts the stock on a cash-adjusted forward P/E of perhaps 3x. That prices in a lot of future weakness.

Another point worth noting is that CEO Solly Solomou remains the company’s largest shareholder, with a near-42% holding according to our data:

Mr Solomou has seen the value of his holding fall from c.£78m to around £22m over the last year. Presumably he is well incentivised to recover some of this lost value.

If the Direct business does have the quality the company would have us believe, then I wouldn’t be completely surprised to see LBG attract interest from trade buyers at current levels. Potentially, of course, Solomou might also engineer a bid to take LBG private at a low valuation…

Graham was neutral on LBG when it had a market cap of £261m in January 2025 (the shares were trading on a forward P/E of 16). While I think that was probably too expensive, I am inclined to think the current valuation may be too low.

The StockRanks view LBG Media as a Contrarian stock with strong Quality and Value scores, but a weak MomentumRank:

This largely mirrors my view, albeit I have some concerns about the underlying quality of the business.

Even so, I think the mix of value, risk and growth potential here could be worth further research.

I am going to move our view up by one notch to AMBER/GREEN, with the caveat that I view this as a speculative situation.